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Sustainability problems can often be characterized as social dilemmas because the 
“rational” strategy for an individual’s short-term self-interest is suboptimal if everyone 
follows the same strategy. Such dilemmas may be overcome through social institutions 
(e.g., common property regimes) and cosmological beliefs (e.g., belief in punitive spirit 
guardians of nature) that alter the costs and benefits, or at least the perception of costs 
and benefits. In this dissertation I examine the efficacy of common property institutions 
and cosmological beliefs for regulating natural resource use among the Miskitu people of 
an indigenous territory located within the Bosawas Biosphere Reserve, Nicaragua. Using 
mixed methods and an interdisciplinary approach, I focus on the relationship between 
individual incentives and prosustainability behavior in a series of studies. First, I analyze 
de facto enforcement of the local common property regime, concluding that it is weak 
due to rules that are inherently difficult to enforce and too few individual incentives for 
enforcers to do so. Second, I test whether individuals who perceive greater resource 
scarcity or who perceive greater severity or certainty of civic punishment for violating the 
rules are more likely to comply with them; they are not. Third, I test whether individuals 
who expect supernatural punishment for overharvesting take less wildlife; they do, but 
this result is not robust against outlier exclusion. However, since individuals with an 
inclusive moral circle may weigh the costs and benefits of their actions to nonhumans, I 
also examine the relationship between wildlife harvests and beliefs in nonhuman 
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personhood (without reference to punishment) and the interconnectedness of humans and 
the rest of nature. Results show that individuals, especially men, who hold more of these 
beliefs harvested less wildlife biomass. This suggests that morally inclusive and relational 
beliefs about nonhumans may alter the way that costs and benefits are tacitly, even if not 
explicitly, perceived. In light of these results – and in consideration of each study’s 
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Humanity is not living in a sustainable way. If the rapid rates of biodiversity loss, 
deforestation, resource depletion, and pollution were not problematic enough, global 
environmental change caused by human activities now threatens to “push the Earth 
system outside the stable environmental state of the Holocene, with consequences that are 
detrimental or even catastrophic for large parts of the world” (Rockström et al., 2009, p. 
472). It is therefore of utmost importance that we understand what factors lead to more 
sustainable behavior. Fortunately, we at least understand the root of why people so often 
do not behave sustainably: it is so often not in their self-interest to do so (Ridley & Low, 
1993). However, common property institutions can alter the material costs and benefits of 
sustainable behavior – and supernatural beliefs and cosmologies of human and nature 
interconnectedness can alter perceptions of costs and benefits of sustainable behavior.  
In this dissertation I examine the efficacy of not only common property 
institutions but also cosmological beliefs for regulating natural resource use among the 
Miskitu people of Nicaragua. In particular, I am interested in understanding why some 
people behave more sustainably than others. Presumably those who perceive greater costs 
or benefits to certain behaviors will act accordingly. I take a mixed methods and 





ideas from economics, political science, psychology, and anthropology. Although a case 
study, it is largely driven by hypothetico-deductive reasoning that could be applied to 
other contexts. In the next sections I raise several theoretical considerations that frame the 
research, and I provide a brief overview of each chapter.  
 
Theoretical overview 
Sustainability: a social dilemma 
 In thinking about what factors contribute to sustainable behavior, it is useful to 
think about what things might limit it. It is easy to see very quickly that there are at least 
two major limitations. First, an individual may have a constrained set of behavioral 
options. For example, if there is no public transit, a person will not be able to use it. 
However, he or she might still have a choice between driving a car, bicycling, or walking 
to the destination. Clearly the decision among these options would be affected by the 
distance to be traveled. This brings us to the second major limit on sustainable behavior: 
the costs to an individual. Indeed, at its core, the problem of sustainability is a social 
dilemma because while our air quality would be better if everyone walked or biked to 
work, each of us might prefer the personal convenience of driving. According to Ostrom 
(1998), “Social dilemmas occur whenever individuals in interdependent situations face 
choices in which the maximization of short-term self-interest yields outcomes leaving all 
participants worse off than feasible alternatives” (p. 1). Social dilemmas are everywhere, 
and they are at the heart of environmental problems involving common-pool resources – 
such as forests, pastures, or fisheries – which are “resources for which exclusion is 
difficult and joint use involves subtractability” (Borgerhoff Mulder & Coppolillo, 2005, 
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p. 130).  
 
Solutions to the dilemma 
 Yet many human societies have overcome social dilemmas (a.k.a., collective 
action problems) in order to manage their common-pool natural resources sustainably. 
Although Hardin (1968) argued that the only solutions to the “tragedy of the commons” 
were individual privatization or state control, a great deal of empirical evidence has 
accumulated showing that common property is a viable alternative (e.g., Agrawal, 2001; 
Feeny et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1990). Successful common property regimes are 
characterized by natural resource management rules that are not only well-suited to the 
local context but are also designed and enforced by those to whom they apply (Ostrom, 
1990). Enforcement of the rules is fundamentally important (Gibson et al., 2005; Keane 
et al., 2008), but this presents a second-order collective action problem: who will incur 
the costs of monitoring and sanctioning? Communities have come up with various ways 
of compensating enforcers or otherwise sharing the costs of enforcement (e.g., McKean, 
1992). However, common property is no panacea; its success is highly contingent upon 
many factors, such as how well enforcement is conducted (Acheson, 2006; Berkes, 
2004).  
 
Communities are made up of individuals 
 Its success also is facilitated by the extent to which community members’ 
interests align. The community-based conservation and common property literature has 
not always paid enough attention to intracommunity tensions (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; 
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Mansuri & Rao, 2004). However, by understanding the divergent interests within 
communities, we can better understand not only why some communities manage their 
resources well and others do not, but also why individuals cooperate with or, in the 
parlance of game theory, defect from the common property institutions. Social 
phenomena are, after all, the result of individual decisions and actions, even as these 
decisions and actions are affected by institutional arrangements. Thus, rather than 
viewing communities as homogeneous, we should recognize the diversity of actors, each 
with a unique perspective on the situation.  
 
The role of cognition 
 Indeed, one general area of study that has not yet received much attention by 
common property researchers is cognition. Although social institutions – “the rules of the 
game” (North, 1990, p. 3) – are often studied at the community level (e.g., 
presence/absence of institutions), how people think about, feel towards, and respond to 
these institutions probably varies. For example, knowledge of the rules (Keane et al., 
2011), expectations of sanctions (Nagin, 1998), and perceptions of legitimacy (Madrigal-
Ballestero et al., 2013) all are likely to vary among individuals – and they are all likely to 
affect compliance with common property institutions. However, these cognitions are 
presumably related to the social reality of which an individual is a part (e.g., Do 
knowledgeable community members educate others about the rules? Are there 
individuals in the community who actually do sanction transgressors? Were the rules 
established through an inclusive, participatory process?). In other words, humans possess 
individual beliefs and agency, but they are also embedded in a social milieu and are 
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affected by what other people do.  
 
Human-nonhuman relationships 
 What if that social milieu includes nonhuman persons? Common property theory, 
which is based on Western dualisms between people (subject/active) and resources 
(object/passive), does not incorporate the idea that the “resource units” themselves can be 
active agents that determine who has rights to access and use them (Schmidt & Dowsley, 
2010). Yet, from the Inuit perspective, a polar bear has the “right to decide who may hunt 
it and when” (i.e., by presenting itself to a hunter) – and humans would be wise to respect 
the bear’s authority in these matters (Schmidt & Dowsley, 2010, p. 384). Failure to show 
adequate respect to a bear could make it angry and retaliatory (Schmidt & Dowsley, 
2010). In this case, then, enforcement of the “rules” of resource withdrawal is performed 
by a nonhuman person, the bear. Although the Inuit believe that resource scarcity is due 
to an improper relationship with bears, not overhunting per se (Schmidt & Dowsley, 
2010), in other indigenous cultures people believe that overharvesting will be punished 
by supernatural guardians or owners of animals (Dennis, 2004; Reichel-Dolmatoff, 
1976). If such beliefs affect behavior they could function similarly to sanctions delivered 
by humans. 
Moreover, in many indigenous cosmologies, humans and nonhumans are bound 
together through kinship and the interconnectedness of all of nature. As Descola (2005) 
described for the Achuar of Ecuador, human-nonhuman relationships can be thought of 
as social relationships: 
Far from being considered prosaic stores of calories and proteins, the forest and 
the swiddens are seen as the theater of a subtle sociability wherein, day after day, 
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one has to tame, seduce and coerce a host of leafy, furry, or feathery beings, that 
only differ from humans by the variety of their appearances and by their lack of 
articulated language. Whether they are treated as consanguines or as affines, 
natural beings do not appear as mere objects of the food quest but as legitimate 
social partners (p. 23). 
 
Salmón (2000) described the Rarámuri concept of iwígara as “kincentric ecology” (p. 
1328). He argued that iwígara guided Rarámuri land management towards sustainable 
practices based on reciprocal relationships with nature (Salmón, 2000). Other scholars 
have made similar arguments that indigenous cosmologies of interconnectedness, 
kinship, and nonhuman personhood promote sustainability (e.g., Chernela, 1987; Pierotti 
& Wildcat, 2000). However, human behavioral ecologists in particular have been 
skeptical that cosmological beliefs cause people to show restraint in wildlife harvests. 
Their skepticism arises due to theoretical reasons such as the underlying collective action 
problem discussed above, but also due to the empirical observation that hunters tend to 
hunt in ways consistent with predictions of optimal foraging theory rather than 
conservation (Alvard 1993, 1994, 1995).  
 
Dissertation overview 
 This dissertation examines the issues raised in the preceding sections by focusing 
on costs and benefits to actors pursuing a prosustainability course of action. The study 
was conducted from February 2010 to January 2011 in Kipla Sait Tasbaika, one of six 
indigenous territories in the Bosawas Biosphere Reserve of north-central Nicaragua. Two 
focal Miskitu villages were selected because of their relatively small size and proximity 
to a larger village that was the seat of territorial governance. This proximity allowed for 
regular visits to the larger village to interview territorial-level leaders and to keep abreast 
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of issues related to governance for the territory. Importantly, Kipla Sait Tasbaika has a 
common property regime with written natural resource management rules that were 
developed through a participatory process, facilitated by nongovernmental organizations, 
during the 1990s. Moreover, according to the ethnographic literature (e.g., Cox, 1998; 
Dennis, 2004; Fagoth et al., 1998; Jamieson, 2009), the Miskitu people believe in 
punitive spirit guardians of certain natural entities. Thus, this field site presented an 
opportunity to examine the efficacy of both common property institutions and 
cosmological beliefs for regulating natural resource use.  
In Chapter 2, I analyze the barriers to the efficacy of Kipla Sait Tasbaika’s 
common property regime. I argue that de facto enforcement is weak because many of the 
natural resource management rules are logistically difficult to enforce and there are few 
individual incentives for people to enforce them. Partly as a consequence of these 
challenges, the ways in which the rules are enforced are perceived by some villagers as 
ineffective and unfair. Moreover, some question the very legitimacy of the rules. I 
suggest that through a participatory revision of the rules and enforcement system – 
perhaps facilitated by external actors – the costs of enforcement could be reduced, which 
should improve the functionality of the natural resource management system. 
Chapter 3 extends the analysis in Chapter 2 by focusing on several cognitive 
variables that are hypothesized to relate to people’s compliance with the natural resource 
management rules. Specifically, using statistical methods, I test whether people’s 
perceptions of resource scarcity, knowledge of the natural resource management rules, or 
expectations of punishment (in terms of severity and certainty) affect the likelihood that 
they violated the natural resource management rules.   
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Chapter 4 turns to the relationship that people perceive they have with nonhuman 
persons. As with the previous chapters, I examine the role of sanctions – except here I am 
interested in people’s expectations of punishment by spirit guardians of nature. Using 
quantitative methods, I test for a relationship between cosmological beliefs – about 
supernatural punishment, interconnectedness with nature, and nonhuman personhood – 
and measurements of actual wildlife biomass harvested. I also qualitatively analyze 
participants’ rich commentaries about their cosmological beliefs in order to validate the 
measures used in the quantitative analysis and to appreciate the subtleties of people’s 
perspectives.   
Finally, in Chapter 5 I summarize the main findings, limitations, and implications. 





























BARRIERS TO INSTITUTIONAL EFFICACY IN A COMMON  
PROPERTY REGIME: A CASE STUDY FROM  
NICARAGUA’S BOSAWAS RESERVE  
  
Introduction 
Common property institutions for the management and conservation of common-
pool natural resources (i.e., resources characterized by problems of excludability and 
subtractability) do not always function well (Acheson, 2006; Barrett et al., 2001; 
Campbell et al., 2001; Dietz et al., 2003). Although common property institutions are 
supposed to structure human interactions and create incentives for cooperation, they are 
not necessarily well-designed (Barrett et al., 2001). Getting common property institutions 
right is difficult both because there are dozens of variables that may affect their success 
(Agrawal, 2001) and because institutions must be responsive to changing social and 
ecological circumstances: “successful commons governance requires that rules evolve” 
(Dietz et al., 2003, p. 1908). The intent of this paper is not to critique common property 
as a route to natural resource management but rather to highlight some of its 
vulnerabilities so that steps can be taken to build institutional efficacy and resilience. To 
this end, this paper takes a case study approach that will allow for a more nuanced 




created common property institutions.  
The present study is one of two related studies concerning the functionality of 
common property institutions in Kipla Sait Tasbaika, an indigenous territory in the 
Bosawas Biosphere Reserve, Nicaragua. In this paper, I argue that de facto enforcement 
is weak and institutional functionality is low because many of the natural resource 
management rules are difficult to enforce and there are few individual incentives for 
leaders and forest guards – many of whom lack adequate training and equipment – to do 
so. Moreover, even though the natural resource management rules were created through 
participatory processes, some villagers perceive them – and/or the way that they are 
enforced – as unfair, illegitimate, and unjust. These perceptions pose a barrier to 
compliance and thus to sustainable resource use. I further argue that these barriers to 
institutional efficacy – the logistical difficulties of enforcement, the lack of incentives for 
enforcers, and the perceptions of injustice – could be overcome through the financial and 
capacity-building support of external actors who facilitate participatory revisions of the 
rules and enforcement system. I make some specific recommendations, and I conclude 
with some general lessons for building institutional efficacy and resilience. 
 
Theoretical background 
Following Garrett Hardin’s (1968) seminal essay on the inevitability of “the 
tragedy of the commons,” many people, including policymakers, thought that the only 
options for protecting common-pool resources from over-exploitation were individual 
private property or state control (van Laerhoven & Berge, 2011). This view was 
challenged by empirical studies showing that communities can in fact manage their 
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common-pool resources successfully without individual privatization or state control 
(e.g., McKean, 1992; Ostrom, 1990; Tang, 1991). They do so through common property 
institutions. In contrast to open access, common property is a form of private property 
that is shared among a group of people who have rights of access and use as well as 
duties of natural resource management (Bromley & Cernea, 1989; McKean, 2000). 
Common property regimes are more successful if the resource boundaries are well-
defined; rules are well-designed for the local context, self-imposed, and self-monitored; 
sanctions are graduated (meaning punishments become harsher with repeat offenses); and 
mechanisms are in place for the resolution of conflicts (Ostrom, 1990). These insights 
were accompanied by a shift in policy away from market- or government-based 
approaches to community-based approaches – and the “community” was hailed as a more 
effective and equitable route to natural resource management and conservation than 
privatization or state control (Mansuri & Rao, 2004).  
Despite the new emphasis on community, it was no panacea; community-based 
conservation did not always succeed in protecting the environment and local livelihoods 
(Acheson, 2006; Berkes, 2004). Agrawal and Gibson (1999) critiqued the way that 
community was conceptualized by researchers and policymakers. Too often communities 
were assumed to be “small, territorially contained groups” that were homogeneous (in 
terms of language, ethnicity, religion, etc.) and bound together by common interests and 
shared norms (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999, pp. 634-635). They recommended that “research 
and policy move away from universalist claims either for or against community” and 
move toward more nuanced perspectives focused on the multiple actors and interests 
within communities and the processes and institutions that characterize and structure 
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interpersonal relationships (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999, p. 630). The value of recognizing 
intracommunity conflicts of interest is evident in studies of elite capture (i.e., when local 
elites dominate “participatory” processes and/or “capture” the benefits of community 
projects; Berkes, 2007; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Platteau, 2004).  
Following Agrawal and Gibson’s (1999) suggestion, we see that individuals 
within a community do not all face the same costs and benefits for cooperating with 
common property institutions. In addition to important strength, status, and power 
asymmetries that can affect who is willing to punish whom (von Rueden & Gurven, 
2012), sometimes a subset of community members is tasked with the responsibility of 
monitoring and sanctioning those who commit violations.1 Without some form of 
material benefits these enforcers would be altruistic punishers. Experimental evidence 
and formal models show that, under certain conditions, people will incur costs to punish 
free riders (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gintis et al., 2003; Ostrom et al., 1992). However, it is 
one thing to incur small material costs to sanction an anonymous stranger in a low-stakes 
laboratory game; it is quite another to sanction one’s neighbor or relative in the real-
world where there is danger of a broken social tie, revenge, or even a feud (Adams & 
Mullen, 2012; Wiessner, 2005, 2012). Indeed, lab-based experiments show that when 
retaliation is an option, altruistic punishment declines (Nikiforakis, 2008; Nikiforakis & 
Engelmann, 2011).  
In order to incentivize enforcers under these conditions, some form of 
                                                 
1 Sometimes communities hire guards from outside the community, but poor, remote communities often do 
not have the funds to hire outsiders. In such cases, the community might compensate (not necessarily 
economically) those members that take on the role of detective or guard – or their rules might stipulate that 
every community member must serve in the role of enforcer on a rotating basis (see Agrawal 1994 and 
McKean 1992). Or, as will be discussed for the communities of the present study, voluntary service is 
expected of only a few select individuals. 
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compensation is necessary. However, if such compensation is not institutionalized, then 
enforcement becomes less likely (uncoordinated costly punishment is rare “in the wild,” 
[Guala, 2012a, 2012b]) and the entire system of common property institutions is 
vulnerable to failure. Many communities have institutionalized incentives for enforcers in 
clever ways, such as by allowing enforcers to keep the fines they charge transgressors 
(McKean, 1992). Unfortunately, compensating enforcers does not guarantee that they 
will enforce in a manner that is procedurally just. For example, if the rules do not specify 
precisely how much will be charged for each kind of infraction, enforcers that are 
allowed to keep the fines they charge might be tempted to charge different fines of their 
allies and enemies. Clear rules and sanctions increase transparency and reduce 
opportunities for abuse of authority (McKean, 1992); they also help to legitimize the 
punishment and thus reduce the likelihood of counter-punishment (Guala, 2012b). 
Furthermore, notions of fairness, justice, and legitimacy affect people’s willingness to 
comply with the law (Eggert & Lokina, 2010; Jenny et al., 2006; Kuperan & Sutinen, 
1998; Madrigal-Ballestero et al., 2013).  
Since the enforcement of natural resource management rules is critical for 
successful common property institutions (e.g., Chhatre & Agrawal, 2008; Gibson et al., 
2005; Rustagi et al., 2010), it is important to understand barriers to institutional efficacy 
in general and enforcement in particular. The present study examines such barriers in the 
context of recently designed institutions for common property management in 
Nicaragua’s Bosawas Reserve. The next section provides details concerning the creation 
of Bosawas, the indigenous territories, and the territorial natural resource management 
plans (including how they are to be enforced). Although the process that created Bosawas 
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was not participatory, the process that resulted in the management plans was. This 
historical perspective helps contextualize the subsequent analysis. 
 
Case study background 
The creation of Bosawas and the struggle for indigenous land titles 
A presidential decree by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro in 1991 created the 
Bosawas2 National Natural Resource Reserve out of 8,000 km2 (subsequently found to be 
only 7,400 km2 when actually measured) of mostly humid tropical broadleaf forest in 
north-central Nicaragua (Kaimowitz et al., 2003). Although this area was from the 
beginning described as a “core zone” surrounded by a “buffer zone” – and later it was 
declared a World Biosphere Reserve by UNESCO – it did not properly constitute a “core 
zone” as is generally meant in the terminology of biosphere reserves because there were 
indigenous groups living in the core zone that made their living by hunting, fishing, and 
farming (Stocks et al., 1998); the core zone was not an area of strict conservation. It was, 
however, an area that had been largely depopulated during the Contra war of the 1980s as 
inhabitants either joined armed groups in the fight or became refugees in other parts of 
the country or Honduras (Kaimowitz et al., 2003; Stocks, 2003). When people returned to 
their homeland in 1991, they “found themselves in a declared natural resource reserve 
that was not demarcated, had little government presence, and was under very active 
agricultural and pastoral invasion” (Stocks, 2003, p. 348). This invasion was encouraged 
by the government’s decision to resettle many former enlisted men and officers in the 
frontier areas around the core zone (Kaimowitz et al., 2003; Stocks, 2003). 
                                                 
2 “Bosawas” – or in Spanish, “Bosawás” – is often used in lieu of the acronym “BOSAWAS,” which was 
formed by taking the first letters of local place names: the Bocay River, the Saslaya Mountain, and the 
Waspuk River (Kaimowitz et al. 2003; Stocks 2003).  
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Rather than accept this invasion, the indigenous residents chose to organize to 
protect their homelands. Isolated from the Pacific mestizo population for centuries, the 
indigenous communities of the Atlantic Coast and Coco River had never been fully 
controlled by the national government (Hale, 1994; Kaimowitz et al., 2003). The Miskitu 
in particular possessed a “militant ethnic consciousness” (Kaimowitz et al., 2003, p. 7; 
see also Bourgois, 1986). Many Miskitu had taken up arms against the Sandinistas to 
defend what they perceived as an affront to their autonomy and way of life (Hale, 1994) – 
and after the war, the Miskitu people maintained a pro-active approach to defending their 
land rights. In 1993, a meeting of various stakeholders – including government 
representatives, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), The 
Nature Conservancy (TNC), representatives of indigenous groups in Bosawas, and others 
– was convened in Managua to discuss a provisional map of land claims (Stocks, 2003; 
Stocks et al., 1998). The discussion set off a series of events and collaborations between 
indigenous groups and NGOs, most notably TNC and Centro Humboldt, that involved a 
major participatory mapping project and demarcation of territorial boundaries for six 
indigenous territories (for a fuller description of the mapping and demarcation process, 
see Stocks, 2003, and Stocks et al., 1998). These efforts culminated, after many years of 
political struggle against a reticent national government, with the granting of territorial 
land titles in 2005 (Stocks et al., 2007).  
 
The creation of the normas ecológicas for natural resource management 
Throughout this process the Nicaraguan Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources (MARENA) sought to maintain the image of a ministry with some control 
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over Bosawas, particularly through the creation of the Technical Secretariat of Bosawas 
(SETAB) – but as Kaimowitz et al. (2003) pointed out, the Nicaraguan government has 
never had meaningful governance of the area. This is due in no small part to the lack of 
roads and basic infrastructure in Bosawas; it is simply extremely difficult and costly to 
maintain a government presence. Given the on-the-ground reality of limited government 
presence, TNC was acutely aware that the best route to conservation was through 
indigenous common property institutions:  
Land titling is a fundamental step for halting the advance of the agricultural 
frontier, the main threat to the reserve. Poorly funded and trained institutions in 
the area and limited enforcement of regulations create a situation of open access, 
with devastating effects for the reserve’s ecosystems. It is very important to 
define clear rights to the natural resources in order to limit this open access. The 
rationale behind giving communal land titles to indigenous groups is that the 
indigenous way of living is environmentally compatible with the reserve’s goals. 
(emphasis added; The Nature Conservancy, 2007, p. 5).  
 
In many respects this rationale is valid. Satellite imagery data show that forest cover is 
preserved better in the indigenous territories of Bosawas than in the surrounding areas 
colonized by mestizos (Hayes, 2007a; Stocks et al., 2007).  Research suggests that the 
local indigenous peoples’ common property institutions – including a system of forest 
guards created with the support of NGOs (see Stocks et al., 1998) – are an important 
reason for limiting mestizo settlement on indigenous lands and protecting the forest’s 
well-being (Hayes, 2007b).  
On the other hand, there is some evidence of potentially unsustainable practices 
below the canopy. For example, tapirs, white-lipped peccaries, and spider monkeys are 
less abundant near indigenous people’s settlements in Kipla Sait Tasbaika, a territory 
within Bosawas, indicating these species may be locally overhunted (Williams-Guillén et 
al., 2006). Subsistence hunting when human population densities are low can be 
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sustainable, but as human populations rise, overhunting becomes more likely. Similarly, 
as “traditional” practices give way to “modern” practices, some conservationists (e.g., 
Terborgh, 2000) worry that indigenous populations will have an impact no different than 
nonindigenous populations. This concern has led to the argument that indigenous peoples 
have a right to their ancestral lands regardless of their land use practices (see Stearman 
1994). However, although this right may be true in a moral or theoretical sense, in 
practice there has been a long history of forced evictions of local people deemed 
hazardous to biodiversity (Dowie, 2005; West et al., 2006).  
TNC, instrumental as it was for the territorial titling process, never lost sight of 
the importance of natural resource management rules for the local Miskitu and Mayangna 
communities within Bosawas (The Nature Conservancy, 2007). In particular, TNC was 
concerned that, given the decade of displacement during which many Miskitu and 
Mayangna depended on humanitarian organizations and observed mestizo practices, 
much traditional ecological knowledge had been lost and new ways of interacting with 
the land had been acquired (e.g., cattle ranching; The Nature Conservancy, 2007). 
Therefore, following the mapping effort, TNC worked with each indigenous territory to 
develop a set of natural resource management rules and enforcement mechanisms known 
as normas ecológicas (ecological norms). In contrast to many stories of top-down 
decision-making and imposition, the development of these normas for the indigenous 
territories of Bosawas stands apart as an exceptionally participatory process that fostered 
a feeling among indigenous groups that these rules were legitimate (Hayes, 2007b).  
From 1994 to 1998, TNC also supported the creation of civil society 
organizations to represent each territory (Stocks, 2003; The Nature Conservancy, 2007). 
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As these indigenous associations gained recognition and received support from various 
NGOs for travel to participate in negotiations with the government, they became part of 
the governance structure for the area (Stocks, 2003). The right of indigenous peoples of 
the Caribbean Coast to self-govern and title their communal lands is codified in 
Nicaraguan law, namely the Autonomy Law passed in 1987 and Law 445 passed in 2003. 
Nonetheless, emerging indigenous associations do not necessarily have the experience to 
navigate the globalized web of government ministries, NGOs, and foreign donors (see 
Chapin, 2000).  
Since the present study took place in only one of the six indigenous territories of 
Bosawas, the following discussion is limited to that territory. Of the six territories, Kipla 
Sait Tasbaika presents a particularly good location to focus on the efficacy of local 
natural resource management rules rather than boundary defense against encroaching 
mestizo populations because it does not border with the buffer zone like the other 
territories do. To the north is the Coco River – the border with Honduras – and to the 
east, west, and south are other indigenous territories. However, this is not to say that there 
are no issues of encroachment in KST, only that the presence of indigenous neighboring 





                                                 
3 For example, the press has reported significant problems of illegal settlement and deforestation in the 
indigenous territories of Mayangna Sauni Bu and Mayangna Sauni As, located to the southwest and 
southeast, respectively, of Kipla Sait Tasbaika (see “Indígenas piden expulsar a colonos de Bosawás,” 
2014, and Rogers, 2013).  
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Kipla Sait Tasbaika 
Kipla Sait Tasbaika (KST) consists of 1,136 km2 (Kipla Sait Tasbaika, 2001) and 
16 communities, most of which are Miskitu.4 The indigenous association that emerged 
from the process described above called itself the Asociación para el Desarrollo del 
Sector Raudales (KUNASPAWA). A booklet published in 2001 in Spanish, Miskitu, and 
Mayangna, and distributed widely throughout KST contained the normas ecológicas de 
manejo (Kipla Sait Tasbaika, 2001).5 These normas outlined in plain terms who had 
rights of access and use as well as what should and should not be done by those with 
rights in order to maintain a healthy environment and sustainable subsistence system. In 
general, people of the indigenous communities within KST were allowed to hunt, fish, 
extract timber for houses or boats for personal use, and plant subsistence crops. Activities 
were restricted according to zones of use based on traditional land use patterns. These 
zones included: agriculture; hunting, fishing, and collection of plants; protection of 
springs and streams; gold panning; historical sites; and conservation. Some rules applied 
across all zones. For example, certain fishing technologies were prohibited (e.g., 
dynamite and plant toxins), the sale of timber to nonresidents of KST was regulated, and 
the clearing of virgin forest was discouraged.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Based on population sizes given by two Nicaraguan ministries, CEDAPRODE and CONADETI (and 
reported in Williams-Guillén et al., 2006, and Acosta, 2010, respectively), the population of Kipla Sait 
Tasbaika grew from 4,500 in 2004 to 5,164 in 2009, which corresponds to a population growth rate of 
approximately 15%. 
5 These normas were originally published in 1998. According to the title page of the second edition (see 
Kipla Sait Tasbaika [2001]), the publication was made possible through financial support from USAID. 
The back cover also listed TNC, SETAB, the Center for Environmental Anthropology, Idaho State 
University, the Centro de Derecho Ambiental y Promoción para el Desarrollo (CEDAPRODE), and Alistar 
Nicaragua, indicating their involvement in some way. 
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Enforcement of the normas ecológicas 
According to Kipla Sait Tasbaika (2001), the promotion and enforcement of this 
management plan is the responsibility of the síndicos of the territory, KUNASPAWA, 
and community leaders. A síndico is officially responsible “to represent the community 
in all matters concerning communal land and he is the overseer of that land, as well as the 
guardian of the land title documents” (Henriksen & Kindblad, 2011, p. 203).  These 
groups were also charged with organizing and soliciting support for the maintenance and 
patrol of the territorial boundary, which are 3 m wide cleared paths through the forest that 
physically demarcate the border. Two forest guards from each community must clear 
these paths once every year as well as patrol them once a month and submit a written 
report of their findings to the síndicos and KUNASPAWA. If someone from outside of 
the territory is caught violating the rules, he or she will be brought before the appropriate 
authorities (unspecified) and charged a fine (unspecified). If someone from within the 
territory is caught, an appropriate sanction will be decided upon at a community meeting. 
Modification of the normas ecológicas can only occur through a territorial assembly at 
which all KST communities are represented (Kipla Sait Tasbaika, 2001). A decade later, 
at the time of field research for this study, these normas were still the de jure law – 




 This study draws on information acquired through structured and semistructured 
interviews as well as participant observation during fieldwork carried out from February 
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2010 to January 2011. Two small, neighboring villages (approximately 321 residents) 
were the focal communities of this study, but since a third, much larger neighboring 
community was the headquarters of territorial governance, I made regular visits there to 
keep abreast of broader territorial issues. I also conducted a few semistructured 
interviews with key leaders from this larger community. Research permission was first 
obtained from territorial-level leaders and then from the two focal villages during 
community meetings. Informed consent was obtained from individual participants. 
People received monetary compensation for their participation in the structured and semi-
structured interviews.   
 In structured interviews with 122 participants, participants were asked about their 
perceptions of resource scarcity, expectations of sanctions for violations of the normas, 
and knowledge of the normas ecológicas (assessed through a “quiz”). Expectations of 
sanctions were determined by a set of questions following three vignettes. In one 
vignette, a fisher violated the fishing quota using an illegal technology (a diving mask). 
In another vignette, a hunter violated the law by killing three tapir when only one per trip 
is permitted. In yet another vignette, the character built and sold a boat to an outsider 
without first obtaining permission from KUNASPAWA (i.e., territorial-level permission). 
Although the vignette did not specify whether the sale was for need or for business – a 
distinction that, according to the de jure rules about the sale of wood, affects whether 
permission must be obtained at the communal or territorial level – most people thought 
that the character violated the law (Chapter 3). Further details about these methods, 
including the text of the vignettes, can be found in Chapter 3. To acquire a better 
understanding of people’s overall perceptions of the normas, I followed the quiz with 
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some open-ended questions asking participants what they thought about these laws – 
were they good or bad? Did they think that they should be changed? Why?  
Semistructured interviews were also conducted with village forest guards, village 
employees of government ministries, and local leaders. These interviews were topically 
focused, respectively, on forest guard training, activities, and support; community 
development projects, many of which had a direct impact on subsistence practices; and 
natural resource management rules, governance, and community issues more generally. 
Because levels of Spanish fluency varied widely across participants, I worked with 
Spanish-Miskitu interpreters as necessary. Interviews were not audio-recorded; rather, 
extensive notes were taken during and following the interviews. Information from 
informal conversations and my own observations also informed the analyses below.  
 
De facto enforcement 
I analyzed people’s responses about whether they thought the normas ecológicas 
were good or bad – and whether they should be changed. Of 121 respondents, 48.8% 
expressed general satisfaction with the normas (at least as they understood them in the 
quiz). Most other respondents were somewhat less pleased. Of these, only 3 explicitly 
said that they wanted a “softer” law, although several of those who said they were fine 
with the current law said that it was suave (soft) – and they preferred it that way. Rolins6 
was perhaps the most honest about his reasoning: he preferred a soft law because 
sometimes he encounters and kills many animals while hunting – and with a strong law 
he might be thrown in jail. More common, however, were those who thought that there 
was a need for a stronger or better-enforced law. For example, Antonella noted that the 
                                                 
6 All participant names are pseudonyms. 
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laws were good but there were problems too because people were always violating them 
by not respecting the trees, streams, and animals. Kiara wanted stronger laws and, 
pointing at her one-year-old baby, asked rhetorically, “what are the children that come 
going to eat?” Others expressed similar concern for the future generations. Some 
participants thought that either the certainty or severity of punishment was too low to 
serve as an effective deterrent. Jerónimo mused that “the people know the laws – but 
without punishment, they do their normal behaviors.”  
A consequence of doing “normal behaviors” seems to be increased resource 
scarcity. As is shown in Chapter 3, (1) many people used prohibited fishing tools and (2) 
many people perceived more fish and game scarcity than before7 – yet few people 
violated the harvest quotas. This combination of facts suggests that local fish and wildlife 
populations have been depleted due to overharvesting. Certainly the connection between 
human foraging behavior and increased resource scarcity was salient for many villagers: 
91% of 115 respondents thought wildlife was less abundant now (Chapter 3).  Of the 105 
respondents who thought that wildlife populations had declined, all identified human-
related causes (i.e., overhunting, overfishing, new technologies like the diving mask, or 
increased human populations). In a few cases the participant thought that wildlife was 
less abundant but not in an absolute sense; the animals and fish were simply hiding or had 
run far away because of human activities. However, most people were quite aware that 
                                                 
7 For example, Luana recalled how her father used to go fishing for just a little while and return with many 
fish, but “now you have to fish all day only to have fish for one time [meal].” Similarly, Iker remembered 
the period after returning from refugee camps in the early 1990s as a time of abundant wildlife. He 
described how easy agoutis were to catch because the dogs would chase them into the river where the 
women washing clothes would kill them with their hands and rocks – and a man could catch a large fish in 
the time it took his wife to cook banano (about 20 minutes). Iker also reflected on the increased 
vulnerability they now faced when he explained how he and his wife had survived on wabul (a drinkable 
banana mash) and fish during the 2005 plague of rats that destroyed the rice and bean harvest – “but now if 
there’s no harvest, the people won’t be able to survive because there are no fish.”  
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animal numbers had declined and a typical explanation was “lots of people, and lots of 
hunting.” For example, Thiago explained that “after the war there had been an abundance 
of fish because during the war there were no people. So the fish and animals multiplied. 
But as the population of people has grown a lot, the population of animals has fallen.” 
Sulan, wearing the figurative hat of culture critic, said that the Miskitu “have the custom 
of basala [plant toxin used for fishing] – and all fish, from big to small, are killed – and 
now there are no fish in the streams.” 
Thus, the limited functioning of the normas system was widely perceived, and 
many people had opinions about why this was the case. Montserrat said, “the law is fine 
but the leaders don’t do their part.” This was a recurring complaint, and by “not doing 
their part” people generally meant that the leaders and/or forestguards did not enforce the 
law adequately. Alma quipped: “the leaders need new batteries because they are 
sleeping.” Others pointed out that the leaders simply did not know what was going on in 
the communities. Simón explained that although the laws were good, the leaders did not 
observe the activities of hunters and fishers – so people were not afraid to violate the law. 
Josefina observed that “the leaders don’t know what people do because they don’t walk 
in the community and they don’t observe – and furthermore the forest guards don’t do 
their job. People walk free.” However, she added that things were better now than before 
because “now there are law [sic] and forest guards.” This latter point raises the possibility 
that perhaps some of the respondents who said they were content with the current laws 
were just glad that there is some form of natural resource management law – while others 
might be glad that the laws are poorly enforced. In his own analysis of community 
sentiment, Jorge thought people aligned mostly with this latter perspective: 
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If I could, these laws that we have, I would set laws [that are] a bit more harsh. 
But as I am not leader, I can’t change anything. But the majority of people think 
that a soft law is good. They don’t want punishments. If we carry on with this soft 
law, we are going to terminate the natural resources.  
 
Validating the criticisms made by some villagers, Ignacio, a territory-level leader, 
described the normas ecológicas sanctioning system by saying “this is a weakness.” He 
explained that when a transgression is brought to the attention of the leaders, all the 
leaders are supposed to show up together at a meeting – but this does not actually happen. 
Usually only a few people show up for the meeting, and they do not want to bear the sole 
brunt of the transgressor’s wrath. Nevertheless, he was able to recount an example of 
enforcement. People from a nearby village had complained about two young men who 
had overfished with prohibited fishing technology. They were put in jail for 3 days in 
addition to being required to do community service and pay a fine to the village making 
the complaint – but, he said, the prisoners had escaped and had yet to pay the fine. My 
own observations were that few people received sanctions for violations – and if a 
sanction was given it usually consisted of consejo (advice/good talking to).  
Finally, de facto enforcement of the normas ecológicas was primarily carried out 
– and expected to be carried out – by the forest guards and communal and territorial 
judges; the síndico did not play a prominent role in this regard.8 If a transgression 
involved outsiders illegally extracting resources, the police or military was expected to 
provide enforcement support – although the nearest outpost was approximately 3 hours 
away by motorized canoe.  
 
 
                                                 
8 If there was a dispute among villagers concerning who had the right to plant on a certain swath of land, 
then the síndico would mediate. 
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Barriers to enforcement and compliance 
There are several reasons why de facto enforcement was weak. First, the normas 
ecológicas include many different kinds of rules (see Chapter 3) – and some are easier to 
enforce than others. Some rules do not specify a concrete limit (e.g., chemical pesticides 
may be used, “but not in an extensive or intensive way” [my translation; Kipla Sait 
Tasbaika, 2001, n. pag.]) and therefore would be difficult to enforce in a fair and 
consistent way. Other rules specify a concrete limit, but whether someone had violated 
that limit would be difficult to know without very close monitoring – and perhaps the use 
of technology not readily available to the forest guards (e.g., each family can harvest no 
more than 10 lbs of fish each week). Other rules are expressed as community values more 
than as specific restrictions on behavior (e.g., wild animals that inhabit the agricultural 
zone like the nine-banded armadillo, agouti, and paca should be valued and preserved). 
Contrast the specificity of the rule stating that “you cannot cultivate or work within fifty 
(50) meters of the banks of small streams” with the rule, “you cannot make a latrine near 
a stream” (my translation; Kipla Sait Tasbaika, 2001, n. pag.). However, setting aside the 
problem of deciding what counts as “near a stream,” it is at least easy to notice a latrine. 
Other violations are considerably more difficult to observe, especially if transgressors are 
intent on concealing them. 
Indeed, some participants pointed out the ease with which the characters in the 
vignettes could conceal their illegal actions. Ariana said of the hunter who killed too 
many tapir, “well, since he was hunting alone, no one will know what he did. Therefore 
he won’t be punished. But if someone does report him to authorities, he’ll receive 
consejo.” Gilberto thought that Jorge, the character who built and sold a boat to an 
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outsider without permission from KUNASPAWA, would be punished but the others 
would not be because “all the people are going to know that Jorge violated the law, but 
the fishers and hunters can catch a lot but nobody is going to know it.” He went on to say 
that perhaps the hunter would tell his wife, but since he knows he’s violating the law, 
he’s not going to want to tell others about it. On the other hand, Martina thought that 
fishers cannot conceal their catches well because “they have to walk in the village with 
the fish to sell them. So the leaders are going to know.” She then recounted how her 
brother, originally from the village but now living elsewhere, had fished often with a 
diving mask and the leaders told him that he needed to stop fishing like that here or else 
they would call the police (this would be an example of consejo). She said that now he 
does not fish here anymore.  
Second, although enforcing the normas ecológicas within one’s home village did 
not necessarily require much – if any – special equipment, there was little motivation for 
unpaid guards to incur the social cost of sanctioning their own family and friends. As 
Ignacio said, people feared the wrath of the transgressor. Although technically the guards 
might not need to confront somebody because they could write a report to the communal 
or territorial judge, in practice not all guards were literate. The training and general 
capabilities of the people who had taken on forest guard duties were major issues 
discussed at a territory-wide meeting of forest guards held in December 2010. According 
to one territorial-level leader, the delays that had plagued this meeting were due to delays 
in funding from an international donor that refused to release the funds because two other 
already-funded projects – one dealing with agriculture, the other sewing machines – had 
not yet submitted any reports. Although I was not able to verify this specific claim, the 
28 
 
lack of financial and institutional support for the forest guards was quite evident, and the 
link between funding of the forest guards and functioning of the formal natural resource 
management system was explicitly noted by Lorenzo, who observed that “in 2008 and 
2009 the laws functioned better because the forest guards did their jobs. But since they 
don’t receive pay, now they don’t work.”9 
Although the focus of this paper is on enforcement of natural resource 
management rules among legal residents of the territory, the duties of the forest guards 
extended further and entailed additional costs. Enforcement of the territorial boundaries 
did not carry the same social risks, but the threat of violent retaliation was greater 
because in a confrontation with outsiders there were no kin or social ties to inhibit 
escalation. Fortunately, in practice the guards were not expected to patrol and clear the 
brush from the boundaries alone; it was a duty divided among the forest guards from the 
entire territory, and each subgroup was responsible for a segment of the border. These 
segments were long enough that they needed to be away for about 20 days. The forest 
guards with whom I spoke stressed the importance of having adequate equipment to 
fulfill these duties. They said they needed, among other things, machetes, hammocks, 
boots, raincoats, backpacks, flashlights, and uniforms. Moreover, they needed to get paid. 
                                                 
9 However, this is not to say that the only laws not enforced well were those that pertained to natural 
resource use. People complained of problems of theft and general disorderliness – but people were afraid to 
stand up to the criminals out of fear of retribution. Irene did not mince words about the matter: “Like the 
young men – like Daniel and Ian (pseudonyms) – [who] walk about like kings, always robbing people and 
not receiving sanctions. So you can say that the law does not work. There are many people who violate the 
law and do not receive sanctions.” The problem of enforcement is one that small-scale societies with no 
police force must address. In fact, during the period of my fieldwork, there was a movement afoot in one of 
the villages to find a new community judge because the current one was ineffectual (and ultimately he 
resigned the position). A previous community judge explained to me that when he had been judge, he had 
been a strong one who could round up a group of young men with machetes and guns to track down and 
punish criminals. While such stories of past bravado must be taken with a grain of salt, I do not doubt that 
this particular individual’s charisma contributed to his efficacy as judge, at least with respect to violations 
of the law that he thought warranted retribution.  
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In a subsistence economy, this kind of volunteer work leaves one – and one’s family – 
vulnerable.  
 
Perceived lack of legitimacy, fairness, and justice 
According to Delfina, lighter violations are dealt with at the community level but 
more grave violations are dealt with by KUNASPAWA. The normas make this point 
implicitly because although a family in need can sell wood to people outside of the 
territory with permission granted by community-level leaders, wood cannot be sold by 
contract or for business without territorial-level permission. The distinction between 
selling for need versus selling for business seems to be a matter of judgment – a judgment 
loaded with ethical considerations and vulnerable to corruption. 
Although I did not include a question explicitly about corruption in the formal 
interviews, people sometimes brought up the issue in conversation or in response to the 
general question about the normas ecológicas. Some participants thought that territorial 
leaders used money from fines for personal aggrandizement and ignored violations by 
their friends and relatives. Those concerned with the latter were in essence concerned 
with procedural justice. This notion was well-expressed by Diego who said:  
The law is good but [its] function is bad. The forest guards say that they are going 
to confiscate diving masks, but they don’t do it. They talk but don’t follow 
through – only once in a while they bother their enemies. Although one is poor, 
rich, Indian, or mestizo, over in Honduras the law applies because it is equal. But 
here, no. I give respect to a law if it is equal. 
 
Given Diego’s indictment of the forest guards, it is interesting to note that one of the 
forest guards also articulated the importance of treating people equally: “If we take the 
prohibited items from everyone, then no one can say they were the only person to have 
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their item taken. You have to be equal.” To do this he thought it was necessary that the 
forest guards, community judges, and soldiers walk house to house to confiscate illegal 
tools together.  
Another factor that likely affected perceptions of procedural justice was that 
specific guidelines for monitoring and sanctioning violations of the natural resource 
management rules had not been established. The normas simply stated that the 
community would decide what sanction to give on a case-by-case basis. Even if more 
specific guidelines were established, people would not necessarily know them; people did 
not have perfect knowledge of the rules as they were (Chapter 3). Yet, not being specific 
contributes to confusion. Responses to the questions about whether and how the 
characters in the vignettes would be sanctioned revealed that villagers had different 
opinions about what sanctions would be given for particular violations (Figure 1). Even 
though knowledge of the rules and expectations of punishment do not guarantee 
compliance (see Chapter 3), shared understandings of these institutions could help 
community members recognize procedural justice, which in turn could build people’s 
trust and confidence in local institutions.10 This is especially important in the local 
context where the natural resource management rules are viewed by some villagers as 
externally imposed and illegitimate despite the participatory design process.  
For example, one day while talking with Diego and another man, Ricardo, the 
conversation turned to the topic of MARENA telling people what they can and cannot do. 
                                                 
10 On the other hand, the normas specify that the community must gather together and collectively decide 
what sanctions to apply in particular cases. In theory this process should contribute to feelings of 
legitimacy, fairness, and justice. In the real world, however, the idealized potential of participatory 
processes is probably difficult to attain due to intracommunity alliances, conflicts of interest, fears of 
retaliation, and opportunity costs for attending meetings. Moreover, as discussed in this paper, people did 










Figure 1. Expected sanctions for violations committed by characters in three vignettes. 
Note: ns in parentheses are the subset of respondents (out of 122) who thought that the 
character in the respective vignette had committed a violation of the natural resource 
management rules, and who therefore were asked whether the character would receive a 
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These two men were quite adamant that if the laws about selling boats or hunting were 
applied equally they would not have a problem with compliance – but as long as other 
people can do it without problems, they will continue to do as they like. Ricardo, 
evidently frustrated, queried the basic legitimacy of the rules themselves: “if MARENA 
says we can’t hunt and fish, then what will the people eat? This is not for an external 
market that we kill, but for consumption. If we don’t kill these animals, what will we 
eat?” In a separate conversation, Dante told me that perhaps the government did not want 
to eliminate poverty in his community because it feared that the people, if no longer poor, 
would buy chainsaws and clear more forest. He added that they might indeed clear the 
forest if they had more chainsaws, but that if the government did not want them to do so 
then it needed to send food supplies so that the people would not need to grow food. In 
support of his argument, Dante cited Nicaraguan Law 445 and said, “all indigenous 
peoples, we have the right to plant, to use the land.”  
This discourse of needs, rights, and justice pervaded the communities and was 
evident in people’s reasoning about whether the characters in the vignettes would receive  
punishment. For example, Paula reasoned that the character in the boat vignette would 
escape punishment by explaining how he had violated the law out of necessity. Lola 
thought that although the characters had violated the law, they were unlikely to receive 
punishment “because animals are for eating” – and perhaps the fisher needed to take a lot 
out of necessity. “So,” she explained, “for this reason they are going to receive light 
sanctions – because they too have the right.” Winston, extending his analysis of justice to 
the global level, thought that the laws of KST (which explicitly recognize local people’s 
resource use rights) should not be changed “because indigenous peoples have the right to 
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progress like those of other countries.”  
 
Discussion 
Nearly half of the villagers surveyed in this study expressed some dissatisfaction 
with the functionality of the common property institutions in Kipla Sait Tasbaika. A 
common complaint was that the leaders and forest guards did not fulfill their enforcement 
duties. However, many of the rules were logistically difficult to enforce, and there were 
few, if any, individual-level incentives for these community members to bear the social 
and opportunity costs of enforcement. Furthermore, the perception that the rules and/or 
the way that they were enforced were illegitimate, unfair, and unjust served as a 
disincentive for compliance. In the following sections, I draw attention to specific areas 
where institutional efficacy could be improved, and I suggest a few ways this could be 
done. I conclude with a call for greater recognition by policymakers of a learning and 
adjustment period at the outset of any newly-created common property regime. Rather 
than prematurely labelling nascent institutions as “failures,” further investment to allow 
for their constructive evaluation and modification to better suit local conditions, norms, 
and constraints is needed.   
 
Improving institutional efficacy 
The forest guards were not enthusiastic about monitoring and sanctioning their 
own family and friends – and most stories I heard of sanctions against normas 
transgressions were stories of territorial-level leaders imposing the sanction. The social 
distance between territorial leaders and local villagers may be a factor that contributed to 
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their willingness to confront rule violators. Indeed, there may be an optimal social 
distance for effective community-based enforcement (if the social distance is too great 
then the system ceases to be community-based and all the issues of external actors as 
enforcers apply). Explicit recognition of this could contribute to identifying which 
individuals should take on the roles of monitors and sanctioners.  
However, there are other routes to improving enforcement efficacy. Recall that 
one of the forest guards suggested that the guards walk together with community judges 
and soldiers to confiscate all illegal tools from everyone at the same time. Doing this 
could transform the act of confiscation from a punitive one involving one person against 
another into a public demonstration of community solidarity – supported by the state – 
and an affirmation of the importance of a transparent and equal process. Given that some 
participants thought territorial leaders used money from fines for personal 
aggrandizement and ignored violations by friends and relatives, such a collective process 
would likely increase perceptions of procedural justice. This is a point worth emphasizing 
because some research has shown that sanctions negatively affect cooperation when the 
sanctioner’s motives are perceived as selfish (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003) – and in the 
present context, people’s expectations of punishment were not associated with their 
compliance with the rules (Chapter 3). Procedural justice could also be improved through 
the clarification of sanctions. The codified rules do not specify what sanctions will be 
given for particular infractions, and there is no explicit mention of graduated sanctions 
even though some people expected sanctions to be lighter for first offenses (Figure 1). 
This lack of specificity opens the door for abuse (McKean, 1992), or at the very least, the 
perception of abuse since there will likely be discrepancies between expected and 
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received sanctions.  
In the political context during which these rules were designed, it was extremely 
important to specify that the responsibility and authority to fulfill the normas ecológicas 
was in the hands of the indigenous communities rather than the Ministry of Environment 
and Natural Resources. Thus, the first steps toward successful common property 
management were the demarcation and securing of territorial boundaries, the receipt of 
legal land titles, and the recognition by the Nicaraguan government of local communities’ 
rights to self-govern. Now that there is a degree of tenure security and autonomy – and 
many villagers perceive increasing resource scarcity and poor management of natural 
resources – it may be time for building local institutional efficacy through participatory 
revisions of the rules and clarification of the sanctions. Although such institutional 
change could happen informally, the normas specify that after no more than 3 years the 
management plan should be revised – and that such a revision requires a territorial 
assembly with representation from all of the communities. As I mentioned earlier, nearly 
10 years later, no formal revisions had been made. However, there was evidence that the 
de facto institutions differed from the de jure ones in ways beyond poor implementation.  
For example, most participants thought that KUNASPAWA needed to grant permission 
to sell wood to people outside of the territory – even in the case of necessity, as was 
specified in a quiz question to assess people’s knowledge of the natural resource 
management rules (see Chapter 3). This suggests that KUNASPAWA was expected to 
play a more prominent role in governance than was specified by the codified rules. One 
likely reason there had been no recent revisions to the rules is because bringing together 
representatives from 16 villages for a territory-wide assembly was costly. Often 
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institutional change occurs “only when relevant political actors perceive gains” (Agrawal, 
2003, p. 245) – or perhaps when external funds are made available. The next section 
addresses the potential role for external actors in building institutional efficacy. 
 
External actors as a source of institutional support 
There is no blueprint for the role that external actors should have in community-
based natural resource management; appropriate roles depend heavily on contextual 
details including local history and power asymmetries. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) 
argued that the funds for implementation of common property institutions should “be 
local, raised through contributions of users rather than granted by central governments” 
(p. 641). Their reasoning was that this was a way for local communities to gain authority 
and control to make their own conservation rules. (In the case of Kipla Sait Tasbaika, 
local communities already have self-governance authority and control, albeit limited due 
to the restrictions on activities within international biosphere reserves.) However, another 
argument based upon global justice could be made:  
Since the benefits of tropical-biodiversity conservation typically extend far 
beyond the communities of local resource users or the boundaries of their nations, 
a significant share of the costs of developing and maintaining the institutional 
capacity to internalize biodiversity externalities necessarily must fall on wealthy 
foreign individuals, organizations, and nations (Barrett et al., 2001, p. 501).    
 
Recall Dante’s suggestion that if MARENA did not want the Miskitu clearing more 
forest, then the government should supply them with food to eat. In essence, he was 
proposing a direct payment conservation strategy whereby people receive payments in 
return for biodiversity or habitat protection (Ferraro & Kiss, 2002). Advocates of 
“payment for ecosystem services” have been criticized for reducing nature to its 
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monetary and service value to humans (Sullivan, 2009) and for trying paradoxically to 
solve a problem created by markets with markets (Büscher, 2012). Viewed from another 
angle, however, there is a compelling case to be made for wealthy nations and people 
with large carbon footprints to offset the costs incurred by poor nations and people for 
protecting, as has been said of Bosawas, “the lungs of the world.” In a more equal world, 
such exchanges would not be necessary. 
Our world being as it is, there is not only an ethical but also a pragmatic argument 
for reflexive collaboration between local communities and external actors. Local 
institutions for common-pool resource management often are connected to a wide range 
of other players, including regional and national governments, civil society organizations, 
and international donors. Moreover, these connections are not necessarily stable, and new 
players enter and leave the system. For example, in 2008 a higher level of indigenous 
organization was established by presidential decree to bring together three indigenous 
territories, including KST, as the Régimen Especial de Desarrollo which would be 
administered by the Gobierno Territorial Indígena, the head of which would be rotated 
yearly among the presidents of each of the three territories. At the time of my field 
research, people seemed hopeful that this unification would strengthen the collective 
indigenous voice, particularly as concerned indigenous rights and access to opportunities 
for sustainable development, including through the direct solicitation of external 
assistance.  
However, all external support is not equally helpful. Research has shown that 
unsolicited external support can “crowd-out” local adaptive initiatives, whereas external 
support solicited by local communities can increase them (Murtinho et al., 2013). Yet, 
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this is where things can get complicated. An immediate and very obvious solution to the 
weak enforcement in KST is to pay the forest guards for their work. Certainly this is a 
solution that the forest guards I spoke with expressed. Unfortunately, this does not 
resolve the deeper problems of rules that are inherently difficult to enforce and the costs 
incurred by other community members who are, according to the normas, supposed to 
participate in meetings to decide on appropriate sanctions for each offense. As one 
territorial leader observed, few people show up to these meetings because they do not 
want to receive the transgressor’s wrath. In other words, the decision to show up at these 
meetings is itself a collective action problem. Thinking through how to solve these 
interconnected social dilemmas requires considerable effort, and there may be a role for 
external actors to provide financial and technical support for it.  
 
General policy implications 
There are compelling arguments for using dynamic feedback processes based on 
deliberate learning from experience to build institutional efficacy and robustness (Berkes, 
2007; Ostrom et al., 2007). This learning could be largely “trial and error” – or it could be 
more directed and intentionally experimental, such as in adaptive management (Duncan 
& Wintle, 2008; Lee, 1999; Stankey et al., 2005). Certainly any management system 
should be expected to need revision as new technologies are adopted, new markets open 
up, people’s aspirations change, and external support waxes and wanes. Moreover, given 
that many variables have been connected to the success of common property management 
(Agrawal, 2001), it is not realistic to expect a recently designed common property system 
to function perfectly from the outset. Rather than jumping to label nascent institutions as 
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“failures,” researchers and policymakers should recognize not only that community 
institutions must be dynamic in a rapidly changing world, but also that there is most 
likely a necessary period of learning and adjustment. In other words, it takes time, effort, 
and very often funds, to design effective institutions. The key to long-term success is 
whether on-going evaluations of the system are used to make adjustments to improve it. 
In a globalized world, external actors (e.g., nongovernmental organizations) may have 
integral roles to play in facilitating this learning process and providing capacity-building 

















THE COGNITION OF COMPLIANCE WITH COMMON PROPERTY 
INSTITUTIONS: A TEST OF FOUR HYPOTHESES  
 
Introduction 
Individual-level incentives play an important role in maintaining common-pool 
resources. A common-pool resource is a resource system where, like a private good, one 
person’s extraction of a resource unit reduces the units available for others to extract, and 
like a public good, exclusion of users is difficult or costly (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008). 
This combination of private and public goods characteristics makes common-pool 
resources especially vulnerable to overexploitation. Aware of this vulnerability, Hardin 
(1968) argued that self-interested actors exploiting a resource open to all would result in a 
“tragedy of the commons.” However, by focusing on open access scenarios – yet 
referring to them as “commons” – Hardin (1968) blurred the distinction between 
common-pool resource, common property, and open access (Cox, 1985; see also Bromley 
& Cernea, 1989). The distinction is not trivial. A common-pool resource is a type of 
resource (e.g., a pasture or forest), whereas common property and open access are types 
of property rights. A common property regime is essentially a “system of shared private 
property” (Johnson & Nelson, 2004, p. 707) through which a group of resource users 




(Bromley & Cernea,1989; McKean, 2000). Much research has shown that tragedies are 
far less likely under a common property regime than in an unregulated, open access, “free 
for all” scenario (e.g., Basurto, 2005; Berkes et al., 1989; Feeny et al., 1990; McKean, 
1992; Ostrom, 1990).  
However, even under a common property regime, the underlying problem 
remains: individuals could maximize their self-interest by taking more than the natural 
resource management (NRM) rules allow – that is, unless noncompliance results in 
penalties severe enough to produce a net cost to the actor. From a theoretical perspective, 
a rational egoist will respond in a self-interested manner to the costs and benefits 
associated with a particular course of action, including illegal behavior (see Becker, 
1968). Consistent with this theory, a large body of field-based research suggests the 
importance of enforcement (i.e., monitoring and sanctioning) for successful management 
of common-pool resources (e.g., Chhatre & Agrawal, 2008; Gibson et al., 2005; Ostrom, 
1990; Rustagi et al., 2010). These findings are corroborated by experimental studies 
showing the importance of punishment for preventing defection in social dilemmas (e.g., 
Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Shinada & Yamagishi, 2007). 
 Importantly, there is a cognitive aspect to a law’s efficacy: awareness of the law, 
including the consequences of violating it, is generally considered a prerequisite for any 
deterrent effect (Keane et al., 2011; Ostrom, 2000; Robinson & Darley, 2004; Waldo & 
Chiricos, 1972). In support of this logic, some criminological studies of perceptual 
deterrence have found that those who perceive greater certainty and severity of 
punishment are less likely to break the law (Nagin, 1998; Wright et al., 2004). Given 




property regimes are often established through participatory processes which not only 
ensure some local awareness of the rules but also increase the likelihood that the rules 
will be perceived as fair and legitimate, further contributing positively to compliance 
(Ostrom, 1990, 2000).  
Participatory processes for conservation gained traction in the 1990s as an 
alternative to top-down approaches that neither respected local people’s rights nor 
guaranteed conservation outcomes. Conservationists shifted away from the exclusionary 
fortress model of conservation and embraced community-based conservation and 
integrated conservation and development projects (Borgerhoff Mulder & Coppolillo, 
2005). These people-oriented approaches are emblematic of sustainable development in 
that the goals of conservation and human well-being are viewed as simultaneously 
achievable if only the right strategies – which are fundamentally context-dependent – are 
used (Berkes, 2004; Ostrom et al., 2007).  
However, even community-based conservation based upon participatory 
processes and local ecological knowledge, which is inherently context-specific, is not a 
panacea (Acheson, 2006; Berkes, 2004). In part this is because local ecological 
knowledge, while profoundly important for community-based conservation, is not 
necessarily integrated into the kinds of explicit social institutions associated with long-
term, sustainable common property management systems (Lu, 2001). Indeed, much of the 
evidence of long-enduring, self-organized institutions for common-pool resource 
management comes from complex societies (e.g., intensive agriculturalists interested in 
regulating irrigation waters; see Ostrom, 1990), yet the areas of most interest to 




areas are often home to small-scale, indigenous societies that may not have experienced 
the resource scarcity necessary to motivate the development of an explicit set of natural 
resource management rules (Lu Holt, 2005; Lu, 2001; Smith & Wishnie, 2000). Lu 
(2001) argued that the notion of resource scarcity is a necessary condition for 
conservation because “natural abundance obviat[es] the need for conservation” (p. 442; 
see also Smith, 2001). The presumption that local ecological knowledge alone is 
sufficient for conservation can leave some communities without adequate institutional 
tools to live sustainably, especially as their populations grow and acquire more efficient 
extractive technologies. Where existing institutions are weak, institution-building may be 
necessary (Berkes, 2004; Chapin, 2000). This is not a task that can be completed quickly 
or cheaply; external financial and technical support may be necessary, especially in the 
context of the developing world where effective enforcement is severely limited by 
economic and infrastructure constraints (Keane et al., 2008).  
The present study is one of two related studies (see also Chapter 2) that examine 
the efficacy of common property institutions in Miskitu communities of the indigenous 
territory, Kipla Sait Tasbaika, part of the Bosawas Biosphere Reserve, Nicaragua. Here, I 
test hypotheses about the role of four cognitive variables in people’s compliance with 
local natural resource management rules. Specifically, individuals were hypothesized to 
be less likely to violate formal natural resource management rules if they perceived 
greater natural resource scarcity (hypothesis 1), possessed greater knowledge of the 
natural resource management rules (hypothesis 2), or expected more severe (hypothesis 
3) or certain (hypothesis 4) punishment for violations. Kipla Sait Tasbaika presented a 




formed through participatory processes. Its codification allowed for the easy 
identification of de jure rules, and its formation through participatory processes meant 
that violations of rules would be more likely to be responses to individual-level, self-
interested incentives than expressions of political resistance against an oppressive 




Kipla Sait Tasbaika (KST) is 1,136 km2 (Kipla Sait Tasbaika, 2001) and one of 
six indigenous territories of the Bosawas Biosphere Reserve in north-central Nicaragua. 
Although the Bosawas Reserve was created by presidential decree in 1991, the 
subsequent creation of these indigenous territories occurred through a participatory 
mapping process that resulted in the granting of communal land titles in 2005 (Chapter 2; 
see also Stocks, 2003, Stocks et al., 1998, and Stocks et al., 2007). The Nature 
Conservancy and other nongovernmental organizations provided capacity-building 
support during this process and contributed to the creation of indigenous civil society 
associations, including one for KST called the Asociación para el Desarrollo del Sector 
Raudales (KUNASPAWA; Stocks, 2003; The Nature Conservancy, 2007). The Nature 
Conservancy and other organizations subsequently worked with KUNASPAWA and the 
residents of KST to develop a set of rules for natural resource management.  
This participatory process produced a set of normas ecológicas de manejo (see 




and distributed widely throughout the territory.11 As Chapter 2 described,  
These normas outlined in plain terms who had rights of access and use as well as 
what should and should not be done by those with rights in order to maintain a 
healthy environment and sustainable subsistence system. In general, people of the 
indigenous communities within KST were allowed to hunt, fish, extract timber for 
houses or boats for personal use, and plant subsistence crops. Activities were 
restricted according to zones of use based on traditional land use patterns. These 
zones included: agriculture; hunting, fishing, and collection of plants; protection 
of springs and streams; gold panning; historical sites; and conservation. Some 
rules applied across all zones. For example, certain fishing technologies were 
prohibited (e.g., dynamite and plant toxins), the sale of timber to nonresidents of 
KST was regulated, and the clearing of virgin forest was generally discouraged. 
(p. 19). 
 
A selection of specific rules can be found in Table 1.  
The two adjacent Miskitu villages selected for this study were chosen because of 
their proximity to a third, much larger, village that was the seat of territorial governance. 
This proximity allowed for regular visits and facilitated interviews with territorial leaders 
about the common property regime (see Chapter 2). The smaller sizes of the focal 
villages were better suited for building rapport and engaging in participant observation – 
particularly important when studying behavior that may be covert.  
  
Data collection 
 Data were collected during fieldwork from February 2010 to January 2011. 
Permission to conduct research was granted by territorial leaders as well as the two focal 
communities during community meetings, and individual-level consent was obtained 
from each study participant. Participation, which was compensated monetarily, was open 
to all adults (18 years and older) residing in the two focal communities. Structured  
                                                 
11 According to the title page, this publication was made possible through financial support from USAID. 
The back cover also listed The Nature Conservancy, Secretaría Técnica de Bosawas (SETAB), the Center 
for Environmental Anthropology, Idaho State University, the Centro de Derecho Ambiental y Promoción 














of sample in 
parentheses 






1 You cannot cultivate or work 
within 50 meters of the banks 
of small streams. 
Yes 90.2 (122) ---- ---- 
2 The conservation zone should 
be utilized frequently to hunt, 
fish, and cut trees.  
No 55.7 (122) ---- ---- 
3 In the case of necessity, a 
family can sell wood to 
people from outside the 
territory without written 
permission from the Board of 
Directors of KUNASPAWA. 
Yes 23.1 (121) ---- strong 
4 In January and February, or 
during the period of 
reproduction for fish, fishing 
is limited to the use of hooks 
only. 
Yes 81.1 (122) ---- ---- 
-- Which of the following 
technologies are completely 
prohibited within the 
territory? 
    
5      bow-and-arrow  No 60.0 (120) ---- ---- 
6      fishing hook  No 95.1 (122) ---- ---- 
7      taralla (type of fishing  
     net) 
Yes 47.9 (121) ---- ---- 
8      li pistalka (complex 
     fishing harpoon)  
Yes 71.3 (122) ---- ---- 
9      máscara and varilla  
     (diving mask and simple 
     fishing harpoon)b  
Yes 76.2 (122) ---- ---- 












of sample in 
parentheses 






11 According to the law, in the 
zone of frequent hunting and 
collection of plants, fishing 
and hunting is limited to how 
many trips per month per 
family? 
2 trips 27.0 (122) 55.4 (121) moderate 
12 According to the law, fishing 
is limited to no more than 
how many pounds per week 
per family? 
10 lbs 8.2 (122) 89.8 (118) strong 
13 According to the law, for 
nine-banded armadillo, paca, 
collard peccary, and white-
lipped peccary, it is permitted 
to take no more than how 
many animals in one trip? 
4 animals 2.5 (121) 98.3 (121) very strong 
14 According to the law, in the 
farthest zone of infrequent 
hunting and collection of 
plants, hunting and fishing is 
limited to how many visits 
per year per family? 
4 trips 6.6 (122) 86.8 (121) strong 
a The sample sizes differ from the percent correct column because “don’t know” responses were 
coded as incorrect for calculating the percent correct, but were excluded for calculating the 
percent below the formal limit.  
b The Spanish version of the normas ecológicas only lists máscara, but the Miskitu version also 
lists trisba, which is a general term for dart or arrow but, as a forest guard explained to me, refers 
specifically to the varilla. Since in practice these technologies were used together (although the 
máscara was also used with the li pistalka, a less common tool than the varilla), I included them 
together much like the “bow-and-arrow” represent one method. 
Note: For open-ended questions 11-14, if a range of values was given, if one number was given 
for small families and another for large families, and/or if the answer differed across species, the 
average was recorded. If the response was for a different period of time, the amount per relevant 








interview questions were translated and back-translated with the assistance of local 
Spanish-Miskitu interpreters.  
 
Violations 
 Observational data on wildlife harvests were collected from early May through 
late December primarily by local field assistants whom I hired, trained, and provided 
with data forms and field equipment. The assistants monitored the comings and goings of 
villagers in order to conduct a brief interview and weigh catches of those returning from 
successful foraging trips. Since not all houses were visible simultaneously, the assistants 
conducted “rounds” through the communities from 6:00 AM to 7:00 PM, except on 
Sundays when assistants only worked from 6:00 AM to 8:00 AM. Sunday was considered 
the most important day for eating well (i.e., eating meat), but as a Christian day of rest, it 
was not considered a good day for hunting, although sometimes hunters would go late on 
Saturday night or early Sunday morning. That the assistants were locals greatly enhanced 
their capacity to keep track of people’s activities – and often villagers would alert the 
assistants as to the whereabouts and activities of household members. In general the 
communities were quite cooperative and participants either waited for assistants to come 
by or actively sought them (or me) out. Sometimes parents would send their children to 
alert us that they had returned with a catch.   
Aquatic and terrestrial faunas were weighed with a hanging digital scale, and the 
species (as determined by the assistant, often in consultation with others present), age 
(juvenile or adult), sex, and count were also recorded when possible. Other information 




by each person; and to whom the actual act of “the kill” or “the catch” was attributed. For 
example, often fishers and hunters would bring helpers who, in the case of fishers, might 
stand on the rocks protruding from the water and collect the fish tossed to them by a 
fisher using a diving mask and harpoon. 
The information collected by these measurements and interviews allowed for the 
identification of violations of certain natural resource management rules. Specifically, the 
total number of times a participant took an illegal tool on a foraging trip; the number of 
times that a participant’s fishing harvest contributed to his or her family’s violation of the 
10 lb weekly fishing limit; and the number of trips a participant took during which more 
than 4 pacas, nine-banded armadillos, collard peccaries, or white-lipped peccaries were 
killed (see rules 7-10, 12, and 13 in Table 1).  
 
Cognitive variables 
 Perceptions of resource scarcity (hypothesis 1) were assessed through a set of 
simple, open-ended questions: “Do you think that now there are fewer wild animals and 
fish than before? Why?” To assess people’s knowledge of the formal NRM rules 
(hypothesis 2), a quiz based on the published normas ecológicas was developed (Table 
1). The questions were a combination of yes/no and open-ended formats. Answers were 
coded 0 = incorrect answer, 1 = correct answer. In practice, people sometimes seemed 
confused as to whether they were being asked about de jure or de facto laws (see below 
for further discussion of this issue), but I found that emphasizing that the task was a 
“quiz” helped clarify that I wanted to know their understanding of the de jure laws.  




which hypothetical scenarios described characters engaged in certain actions that violated 
the laws laid out in the normas (Table 2). Following each vignette, participants were 
asked whether they thought the imaginary characters had violated the law of KST, and if 
so, whether – and how – they would be punished (Table 3). Severity of punishment 
(hypothesis 3) refers to whether participants thought the characters would be punished 
harshly, lightly, or not at all (higher values = more severe); only participants that thought 
the character violated the law were included. Certainty of punishment (hypothesis 4) 
refers to a participant’s degree of conviction (where 1 = not certain, 7 = very certain) that 
the character would indeed be punished; only participants that thought the character 
violated the law and would receive punishment were included. Because the vignette in 
which a character sold a boat without territorial-level permission (see the “Selling a 
Boat” vignette, Table 2) did not specify whether the sale was for need or for business – a 
distinction that the de jure law makes – responses to this vignette were excluded from the 
analyses below (inclusion does not qualitatively affect the results). 
 
Control variables 
 Formal education was thought to be important to control for because people with 
greater education would likely be better able to read (and thus know) the codified laws, 
they would be more likely to have received environmental education in school, and they 
would be more likely to have jobs such as teaching in the local schools or working for a 
government ministry that would not only limit their time available for foraging but also 
allow them to purchase much of their food from local general stores or active foragers. 










Vignettes to assess expectations of punishment for noncompliance with natural resource 





Jorge lives in Kipla Sait Tasbaika. Jorge made a large 
boat and sold it to a man from Li Lamni. Jorge did not 
receive permission from KUNASPAWA. 
Over-Fishing Mateo lives in Kipla Sait Tasbaika. Mateo is a good 
fisher. When the river is clear, he fishes almost every day. 
He uses a diving mask and harpoon. He always takes a lot 
of fish. In this week he caught more than 10 lbs of fish. 
Over-Hunting Julio lives in Kipla Sait Tasbaika. Julio is a good hunter. 
He hunts 2 or 3 times every week. One day he is hunting 
with a rifle in the bush and he encounters a group of tapir. 
He kills three tapir: 2 adult females and 1 adult male.   
a Responses to this vignette were excluded from the measures of expected punishment for 













Responses to questions following noncompliance vignettesa 
 
Question  Response Summary 
  Response Description Selling A Boat Over-Fishing Over-Hunting 
1 Do you think that [the character] 
violated the law of KST?  
% yes 83.6 (122) 77.0 (122) 77.9 (122) 
If respondent answered “yes” to the preceding question, then the following questions were also asked. Percentages given reflect 
only the relevant subsets of respondents. 
2 Do you think that [the character] is 
going to receive a sanction?  
% yes  
 
78.4 (102) 63.8 (94) 61.7 (94) 
3 [If yes] What sanction? % advice/good talking to 
% fine  
% prison 
% confiscation of tools/property 
% graduated sanction 


























44.9 (78) 26.7 (60) 26.8 (56) 
5 Do you think that it is very certain that 
[the character] is going to receive a 
sanction? 
average degree of certainty based 
on Likert scale where 1 = very 
uncertain, 7 = very certain 
5.3 ± 1.8 (76) 5.4 ± 1.6 (57) 5.4 ± 1.7 (56) 






would be observed committing a violation, the number of foraging trips was controlled 
for as well. The tally of foraging trips includes trips that were not focused exclusively on 
hunting or fishing (e.g., an animal was encountered and killed while participant was on 
the way home from weeding a garden), and it includes only successful trips (i.e., 
excursions during which wild fauna – including fish, mammals, birds, reptiles, 
crustaceans, and/or snails – were actually caught/collected by anyone in the foraging 
party). Although the NRM rules only prohibit certain fishing tools, it is plausible that a 
forager could have taken and used an illegal fishing tool unsuccessfully – but was able to 
make the most of the trip by collecting some river snails; thus, all successful faunal 
harvesting trips are included in the tally. Sex was also controlled for because Miskitu 
men and women engage in different subsistence activities (e.g., although both men and 
women fish, generally only men hunt), and use different tools (in particular, only men 
fish with diving masks). See Table 4 for definitions and summary statistics for the 
dependent and independent variables. 
All statistical analyses were performed with R 3.1.0. 
 
A word about scientific and ethical considerations 
The foremost scientific difficulty in any study of illicit behavior is that individuals 
may be motivated to conceal their illicit behavior. To reduce the incentive for people to 
provide false or otherwise misleading information, researchers investigating illegal 
harvests of natural resources should avoid having ties to regulating agencies (Gavin et al., 
2010) – and I did not have any, a fact that became generally appreciated by the villagers. 






Definitions and summary statistics of variables 
 
Variable Definition n Mean SD Range 
Dependent       
 Violations Total number of times 
• Took an illegal fishing 
tool on foraging trip  
• Contributed to his/her 
family exceeding the 
limit of 10 lbs of fish per 
family per week 
• Participated in a foraging 
trip during which more 
than 4 pacas, nine-
banded armadillos, 
collard peccaries, or 
white-lipped peccaries 
were taken 
145 1.47 3.23 0-28 
 Cooperator / 
violator 
Classification as 
“cooperator” (0) or 
“violator” (1) based on 
above evidence 
145 0.47 0.50 0-1 
Explanatory      
(H1) Perceived resource 
scarcity 
Belief that there are fewer 
animals now than before (0 
= no, 1 = yes) 
115 0.91 0.28 0-1 
(H2) Knowledge of 
formal NRM rules 
Score from NRM rule quiz 
(possible scores: 0-14) 
117 7.36 1.74 3-10 
(H3) Perceived severity 
of civic punishment 
Belief that characters in two 
formal rule vignettes would 
be punished harshly (2), 
lightly (1), or not at all (0) 
82 1.63 1.28 0-4 
(H4) Perceived certainty 
of civic punishment 
Conviction that characters in 
two formal rule vignettes 
would receive punishment (1 
= very uncertain, 7 = very 
certain) 
47 10.73 2.57 5-14 
Control      






Table 4 continued 
 
Variable Definition n Mean SD Range 
 Formal education Maximum education of 
participant 
143 6.59 3.73 0-13 
 Foraging trips Number of trips during 
which someone in 
participant’s foraging party 
harvested wild fauna 























method which was noticeably absent from the recent review by Gavin et al. (2010) of 
methods for measuring illegal natural resource behavior – is that rapport, trust, and 
friendship develop between researcher and study participants. Moreover, as a participant-
observer, one learns who is doing what through local gossip in addition to direct 
observations. For example, in a community with limited means of food storage, harvest 
quantities in excess of what the household can readily consume are usually gifted or sold; 
it is difficult to gift or sell large quantities of anything without this being common 
knowledge in the community. Thus, the noncompliance harvest data should be 
meaningful even if they are underestimates. The noncompliance tool use data are more 
susceptible to concealment because these data, while sometimes directly observed, were 
often self-reported during interviews. The issue of concealment will be revisited below. 
The foremost ethical consideration in research on illicit behavior is that 
participants could face penalties if their illicit behaviors are exposed to authorities. In the 
case of indigenous communities – often marginalized and lacking secure land tenure – 
the risk is compounded if high rates of violations prompt governments to take punitive 
actions against entire communities. Therefore, any given study’s risks to individuals and 
communities must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.12 As described in Chapter 2, the 
existence of Nicaraguan laws that recognize indigenous rights, the granting of communal 
land titles to the indigenous territories of Bosawas in 2005, and the fact that the formal 
natural resource management rules of KST were created through participatory processes 
and do not require specific sanctions for violations (i.e., the community collectively 
decides for each case) all indicated that risks to study participants and communities were 
minimal. To my knowledge no participant received a sanction as a result of participation 
                                                 








Approximately 321 people resided in the focal study villages, and 75 men and 70 
women participated in the study. Although I sought to include all adult residents in all 
aspects of the study, due to people’s comings and goings, not all information is available 
for all participants (see Table 4). The subject of NRM rules and expectations of 
punishment was covered in the second of two long interviews, with a subset of 122 
participants. This subset includes at least one adult from each household (44 households 
at start of study; 49 at end of study).  
 
Preliminary analyses 
 The results of Welch’s t-tests indicated that mean values for knowledge of the 
NRM rules (i.e., quiz scores), severity of punishment, and certainty of punishment did not 
differ significantly among participants according to their sex or village of residence 
(alpha = .05). Although it is possible that people who took the knowledge quiz later 
might have heard about it from those who had already taken it – and therefore could have 
prepared for it – there was no correlation between quiz score and the order in which 
people were surveyed (r = 0.06, p = .53). The results of nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests showed that mean number of violations did not differ significantly between 
sexes (W = 2421, p = .38) or villages (W = 1514, p = .18). Therefore, the data for men 




sample size. None of the four cognitive variables were significantly associated with each 
other. Of the total 145 participants, 68 committed at least one violation of the formal 
natural resource management rules. Because over half of the participants did not commit 
any violation (or at least there is no evidence of their violations), and 91% committed 
fewer than 4 violations, the variable was dichotomized such that 0 = no evidence of 
violations and 1 = evidence of at least 1 violation.  
 
Main analyses 
In order to test whether the four cognitive variables were associated with 
transgressions of the normas, a series of binary logistic regression analyses were 
performed with status as either a “violator” (i.e., having committed at least one violation) 
or “cooperator” (i.e., having committed no violations) as the dependent variable. 
 
H1: Perceived resource scarcity 
Out of 115 respondents, 87% thought that there were fewer animals now than 
before, and another 3% thought that now there were fewer fish even though there was the 
same amount of terrestrial animals. Since there were too few cases of individuals who 
thought only fish had declined to analyze separately, I combined these two groups into 
one that perceived fewer resources now than before and compared it against those that 
did not perceive fewer resources to see if people who perceived resource scarcity were 
less likely to have committed at least 1 violation of the NRM rules; they were not (χ2 (1, 
n = 115) = 0.39, p = .53).  Controlling for total foraging trips, sex, and formal education 




perceived resource scarcity and violation of the NRM rules (Model 1, Table 5). Lumping 
the 4 participants who perceived scarcity in terms of fish but not land animals with those 
who did not perceive any scarcity did not qualitatively change these results. 
 
H2: Knowledge of management rules 
 As shown in Table 1, responses to the open-ended quiz questions indicated that 
(1) most people did not know the exact limits specified in the normas ecológicas, and (2) 
most people thought that the codified limits were below what they actually were. To the 
extent that people’s understanding of the rules affects their behavior, people should have 
been likely to comply with these quotas, and this is what the data show, at least for the 
two questions for which data were collected. Only 14 violations of the 10 lbs per family 
per week fishing limit occurred across 63 families over 33 weeks. Eight of these 
violations were committed by the same family. Only 1 individual violated the limit of no 
more than 4 nine-banded armadillos, pacas, collard peccaries, or white-lipped peccaries 
in one trip – and according to the data, he only violated this rule on two occasions. Thus, 
most violations had to do with taking a prohibited fishing tool on a foraging trip.  
People with greater knowledge of the NRM rules were not more likely to have 
committed a violation than those with less knowledge after controlling for total foraging 
trips, sex, and formal education (Model 2, Table 5). However, since knowledge of the 
NRM rules was assessed through a quiz that included open-ended questions that most 
people got wrong because they gave responses that were below the formal limit, these 
answers – although technically incorrect – should be associated with fewer violations if 






Results of logistic regressions with violator/cooperator (1/0) as dependent variable 
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a Model χ2 (4) = 37.8, p < .0001, n = 115 
b Model χ2 (4) = 34.9, p < .0001, n = 117 
c Model χ2 (4) = 27.7, p < .0001, n = 82 
d Model χ2 (3) = 14.2, p < .01, n = 47 





generous scoring of the quiz (i.e., scoring as “correct” all those responses to the open- 
ended questions that were below the formal limit) – and controlling for total foraging 
trips, sex, and formal education – found results similar to the harder version of the quiz 
(B = 0.19, SE = 0.13, OR = 1.20, 95% CI = 0.94-1.56, p = .14, n = 112).  
 
 H3: Perceived severity of punishment 
Responses to the vignettes revealed that most people thought the characters had 
violated the law of Kipla Sait Tasbaika (Table 3). Of those participants who thought that 
the characters had violated the law, majorities thought that the characters would receive 
some kind of light punishment. However, people with greater perceived severity of 
punishment were not less likely to have committed a violation than those with lower 
perceived severity, after controlling for total foraging trips, sex, and formal education 
(Model 3, Table 5).  
 
H4: Perceived certainty of punishment 
Respondents were, on average, moderately certain (mean = 5.36 on 7-point Likert 
scale; see Table 4) that punishments would be received. Since sex was not associated 
with likelihood of being a violator of the NRM rules – and since data on certainty of 
punishment were available for only 47 respondents (see Table 3) – in order to increase 
degrees of freedom in the logistic regression with certainty of punishment, only total 
foraging trips and formal education were included as controls. As shown in Model 4 
(Table 5), people who were more certain that punishment would be given for 





To evaluate if these results were artifacts of model specification, each control 
variable was systematically excluded, and the effect of adding age to each model was 
examined. The inclusion or omission of foraging trips, sex, formal education, and age did 
not change the positive direction or statistical insignificance of the effects of the 
cognitive variables. However, adding age to the model with the generous scoring of the 
NRM rule quiz caused the log-odds ratio to increase from 0.20 to 0.29 and become 
borderline statistically significant (B = 0.29, SE = 0.15, OR = 1.34, 95% CI = 1.01-1.81, p 
= .051, n = 111). In other words, holding age, foraging trips, sex, and formal education at 
fixed values, every question a participant answered correctly on the NRM quiz increased 
the odds that he or she had committed at least 1 natural resource management violation 
by 34%.  
Unsurprisingly, in all models individuals who had taken more foraging trips had 
higher odds of having committed a violation of the NRM rules than those who had taken 
fewer trips (Table 5). 
 
Discussion 
 Contrary to expectations, individuals who perceived greater resource scarcity, had 
greater knowledge of natural resource management rules, expected more severe 
punishment, and were more certain of receipt of punishment were not less likely to have 
committed a violation of the NRM rules (see Table 5). These results seem unlikely to be 
due simply to small sample sizes since the direction of the relationships was positive – 




discussion offers some possible explanations and implications of these results, and 
suggests avenues for future research.  
Perceptions of resource scarcity are probably best thought of as a necessary 
condition but poor incentive for conservation. The recognition of scarcity is a key first 
step, but the challenge is taking the next step of behavioral modification. Vickers (1994) 
described “nascent conservation” among the Siona-Secoya and concluded that, “One 
lesson to be drawn from this case is that ‘conservation’ is not a state of being. It is a 
response to people’s perceptions about the state of their environment and its resources, 
and a willingness to modify their behaviors to adjust to new realities” (emphasis added, p. 
331). Of course, it is not only willingness that matters but actual behavior. For example, 
Brooks (2010) found that mushroom harvesters in Bhutan who believed conservation was 
important because resources were scarce were, after controlling for other variables, 13.2 
times more likely to be willing to reduce their harvests than those who did not perceive 
scarcity. However, Brooks (2010) did not measure actual behavior, only willingness to 
reduce one’s harvest, so the caveat of “ideal versus real” must be made. Herein is the 
crux of the conservation problem: we can agree that we should use fewer resources, but 
actually using fewer resources is, as the global climate change crisis illustrates, very 
difficult. In fact, perceptions of dwindling resources could have the effect of inciting 
greater resource competition, possibly resulting in intensification of resource use as 
people scramble for a piece of the pie before it is gone (for research on the relationship 
between resource scarcity and violent conflict, see Durham, 1976, and Homer-Dixon, 
1994).  




management rules were not more likely to abide by them. This suggests that (1) having 
knowledge of the rules did not prompt participants to conceal their illegal behaviors, and 
(2) educating people about the rules is not enough to guarantee compliance. Like 
awareness of resource scarcity, knowledge of NRM rules may be best thought of as a 
necessary but insufficient condition for pro-environmental behavior. For NRM laws to 
matter, they must be enforced (Keane et al., 2008). Yet, in the present study, neither 
perceived severity nor certainty of punishment related to compliance. Moreover, the 
direction of the relationship with having committed at least one violation was positive 
(although not statistically significant; see Models 3 and 4, Table 5), suggesting that, if 
anything, people who expected punishment were more likely to have violated the rules.  
One possible explanation for these latter results is that people’s perceptions do not 
align with realities – or more precisely, perhaps my methods for ascertaining people’s 
perceptions do not align with realities. Even though some people said that the characters 
in the vignettes would be punished, my own observations were that people were rarely 
punished – and usually punishment, when it did occur, consisted of “advice” only 
(Chapter 2). It is possible that some participants responded to the vignette questions with 
what they thought should happen rather than what they thought actually would happen. I 
used vignettes instead of asking participants to self-report the times that they had been 
sanctioned because I was concerned about asking such a personal question, but it is also 
possible that people think that other people are more or less likely to be punished than 
themselves. Methodological issues aside, another possible explanation for why the 
cognitive variables did not relate to compliance as expected is that most natural resource 




one’s current consumption levels for future generations’ consumption is more difficult 
for people living in poverty. The immediacy of basic needs such as food, water, and 
shelter tend to prevail over concerns about future generations. Thus perhaps people were 
willing to risk punishment in order to meet those needs. 
 Yet, it is important to recognize that by far most villagers complied with the 
harvest quotas; the majority of rule infractions involved the use of prohibited fishing 
technologies. Other technologies that were prohibited but never used during the study 
period included dynamite and hand grenades. A commonly used prohibited technology 
was the diving mask, which, when used with the varilla or pistoeta (li pistalka), is much 
more efficient than fishing by hook-and-line, mosquito net, bow-and-arrow, or lure 
(Koster, 2007). In other conservation contexts, the prohibition of new technologies has 
been criticized for being a form of “enforced primitivism” because local communities 
must maintain a “traditional lifestyle” – or else face eviction (Borgerhoff Mulder & 
Coppolillo, 2005, p. 189). The logic of managers is simple: more efficient technology 
will result in larger harvests. However, this logic rests on the assumption that with more 
efficient technology people will spend just as much time fishing as before rather than do 
something else. Questioning the requirement that only “traditional methods” be used in 
Paraguay’s Mbaracayú Reserve, the local Aché people asked: “Our methods have 
changed radically over the twentieth century. Which of these are traditional, and who 
decides? Why are only traditional methods allowed? Isn’t it important how many animals 
we kill, not how we kill them?” (Hill 1996, cited in Borgerhoff Mulder and Coppolillo, 
2005, p. 189). These are good questions that challenge the ethics of conservation 




local people were involved in the design of the natural resource management rules, and in 
interviews many participants cited the use of diving masks for the decline in fish 
populations (Chapter 2). In contrast to the Paraguayan law, the normas ecológicas do not 
specify that the indigenous residents of Kipla Sait Tasbaika must use only “traditional 
methods.” Instead, prohibited technologies are listed by name, thereby avoiding the 
tension and confusion created by pitting “traditional” against “modern.” 
That the normas ecológicas were created through participatory processes likely 
contributed to people’s overwhelming compliance with the harvest quotas. There are 
stronger incentives to comply with formal rules when they coincide with community 
norms and values (and vice versa). On the other hand, people’s compliance with the 
harvest quotas could be a consequence of resource scarcity rather than conscious 
decision-making – in other words, it could be a byproduct of past overharvesting. As 
Chapter 2 showed, most villagers thought human foraging practices were to blame for 
fewer fish and game now than before. Perhaps the awareness that past behaviors had 
caused the current resource scarcity was the reason that almost half of respondents 
indicated some displeasure with the current system of NRM rules. Importantly, most of 
this displeasure was not over the existence of NRM laws per se but over their lack of 
enforcement and general dysfunction. Enforcement of the normas was largely the 
purview of local leaders, including a voluntary group of local forest guards who not only 
lacked individual incentives for monitoring and sanctioning transgressors but also were 
unable to fulfill many of their duties due to limited funds and institutional support 
(Chapter 2).  




common pool resource management, this study’s results should be interpreted with 
caution – and its limitations should be kept in mind. First, participants may have 
concealed some or all of their illegal activities. Hiring local community members as field 
assistants rather than bringing in outsiders probably simultaneously decreased the ease 
with which participants could conceal their activities and increased their comfort with 
sharing them. I was initially worried that individuals with greater knowledge of the rules 
would be more likely to conceal their illegal behaviors, but since the results showed that 
knowledgeable individuals were more likely than others to have committed a violation, 
this is unlikely to have been the case. Second, people’s compliance with all of the NRM 
rules was not evaluated; data are available to examine for only specific types of 
violations. For example, the behavioral data come from May through December, so the 
data do not permit an analysis of temporal restrictions on harvests in other months (e.g., 
each family is permitted to take only 1 male iguana per week in March). Third, 
Paternoster (1987) has argued that in order to distinguish between a deterrent effect and 
an experiential effect, the measurement of expectations of punishment should occur prior 
to the measurement of behavior. However, in the present study, there were other 
considerations that factored into the ordering of methods. Specifically, the quality of the 
data on actual violations was prioritized (asking people early in the study about their 
expectations of punishment seemed to me to be a recipe for prompting people to conceal 
their illegal behaviors), and waiting until later in the study to ask people about their 
beliefs about sanctions and the overall functioning of the NRM system meant that by then 
substantial rapport had developed which surely contributed to participants’ willingness to 




2). Fourth, there could be omitted variable bias. For example, it is possible that people 
with larger social networks are more likely to know the NRM rules (because they learn 
about them from others) and also more likely to violate them (because they must be more 
productive and efficient fishers in order to satisfy all their social obligations).  
Finally, under conditions of weak enforcement, as Chapter 2 argued was the 
situation in the study villages, people may tacitly – even if not explicitly – understand 
that they will not be caught and/or punished for violations. Collecting systematic 
observational data on actual enforcement (not only rates of noncompliance) would allow 
for an assessment of people’s perceptual accuracy. Additionally, the contested fairness, 
legitimacy, and justice of the sanctioning system may also help explain why expectations 
of punishment did not relate to violations (Chapter 2). Thus, future quantitative research 
examining the determinants of people’s compliance with natural resource management 
rules in KST should refine the methods used to ascertain people’s expectations of 





THE EFFECT OF COSMOLOGY ON WILDLIFE HARVESTS:  
A STUDY OF INTRACULTURAL VARIATION AMONG  
THE MISKITU OF NICARAGUA 
 
Introduction 
An on-going discussion in the anthropological literature examines the role of 
traditional belief systems in determining indigenous peoples’ comparatively small 
ecological impact. On the one hand, indigenous peoples possess intricate knowledge of 
ecological relationships (Hunn et al., 2003; Posey, 1985; Redford & Padoch, 1992; 
Turner et al., 2000), often accompanied by ontologies that do not draw sharp divisions 
between human beings and the rest of nature (Descola, 1996; Pierotti, 2011; Salmón, 
2000; Willerslev, 2004). This perception of interconnectedness has been linked to 
behavior that not only shows respect for the natural environment but also promotes its 
sustainable use (Berkes, 2008; Salmón, 2000). Sometimes embedded within traditional 
cosmologies are beliefs about supernatural punishment for inappropriate environmental 
behavior (e.g., overharvesting) – and Reichel-Dolmatoff (1976), among others, suggested 
that such beliefs function to promote conservation. On the other hand, the tendency for 
humans to discount the future and the difficulty of overcoming collective action problems 




Smith & Wishnie, 2000). Moreover, detailed quantitative studies of human foraging 
populations have shown that hunters’ behaviors generally correspond nicely with 
predictions from optimal foraging models (Alvard, 1993, 1995; Hawkes et al., 1982; Hill 
et al., 1987; but see Koster, 2008a). These latter theoretical considerations and lines of 
evidence suggest that the apparent sustainability of natural resource use by at least some 
indigenous peoples could be a byproduct of factors other than belief systems, such as low 
population density, inefficient extractive technology, and limited access to markets 
(Johnson, 1989; Low, 1996; Vickers, 1994).  
The present study clarifies the relationship between indigenous cosmologies and 
environmental impact in three key ways. First, it focuses explicitly on the empirical 
relationship between belief and behavior at the individual level. Although this approach 
is common in environmental psychology research conducted among “WEIRD societies” 
(sensu Henrich et al., 2010: “Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic,” 
p. 61), few ethnographically-based studies among non-WEIRD populations utilize it (but 
see Zavaleta, 1999). However, such an individual-level analysis has certain advantages, 
namely that it clarifies the relationship between specific beliefs and specific behaviors, 
avoids essentialism by recognizing within-culture variation, and naturally controls for 
other factors that frequently vary across communities (e.g., proximity to markets). 
Second, rather than rely on self-reported behavior (as most environmental psychology 
studies do), the present study uses behavioral observations. Often the lack of systematic 
observational data has left previous ethnographic studies of the relationship between 
indigenous cosmologies and conservation vulnerable to the criticism that people’s 




present study does not rely on people’s explanations for why they do things – which 
could simply be post-hoc rationalizations (or attempts to please the researcher). Instead, 
participants were asked about their beliefs irrespective of their own behaviors; it is 
through statistical analysis that a link between particular cosmological beliefs and 
particular behaviors is examined. 
Specifically, I combine quantitative and qualitative data collected among Miskitu 
horticulturalists of Nicaragua to analyze the relationship between indigenous cosmology 
and environmental impact. I pair self-reported information about cosmological beliefs 
with observational data on fishing and hunting harvests to test whether individuals 
harvest less wildlife biomass if they hold cosmological beliefs of interconnectedness and 
nonhuman personhood (explained below) and/or if they expect supernatural punishment 
from spirit guardians for overharvesting. I then draw on participants’ interview responses 
and commentaries to construct a qualitative understanding of people’s cosmological 
thinking and provide a fuller context for the interpretation – and validation – of the 
quantitative analysis.  
 
Indigenous cosmologies 
Common beliefs in traditional cosmologies of indigenous peoples include beliefs 
that nonhumans have personhood (i.e., animism); all of nature, including humans, is 
interconnected; and humans and nonhumans are kindred. In essence, these cosmologies 
do not draw a clear ontological division between humans and the rest of nature (Descola, 
2005). Animistic thinking attributes a spiritual essence – a “soul,” “spirit,” or “energy” – 




2004).  Ethics, such as respect, tend not to be confined to the realm of human beings but 
are extended to the entire community, which in indigenous cosmologies frequently 
includes nonhuman others (Pierotti & Wildcat, 2000) – even to the extent that humans 
and nonhumans are thought to share a kind of kinship (Bird-David, 1990; Descola, 2005; 
Salmón, 2000). Empathy, likely facilitated by a belief in nonhuman personhood (or 
“other-than-human persons” [Hallowell, 1960]), is often a component of respect, as 
expressed by a Yup’ik man when discussing his feelings for geese: “They’re trying to 
live, like us, right? But we still kill them, which is sad” (Zavaleta, 1999, p. 240). Often 
incorporated into indigenous ontologies of interconnectivity are beliefs that natural 
entities such as forests, bodies of water, and wildlife possess spirit “owners” or 
“guardians.” For example, in the cosmology of the Amazonian Napo Runa, “each species 
is managed by a dueño, or owner, who is the spirit master. Animals do not come to 
hunters on their own accord; the dueño releases them for the hunter to kill” (Uzendoski, 
2004, p. 887).  
The case has been made that these kinds of cosmological beliefs – which I will 
refer to as cosmologies of interconnectedness and nonhuman personhood (and for 
brevity’s sake, “INP” cosmologies) – contribute to sustainable resource use and 
conservation (e.g., Anderson, 1996; Berkes, 2008; Chernela, 1987; Grim, 2001; Pierotti 
& Wildcat 2000; Reichel-Dolmatoff, 1976; Salmón, 2000; Sponsel, 2012). However, 
although the outcome of such beliefs may be low environmental impact, that is not 
necessarily the conscious motive of an actor. Conversely, although an actor may express 
a conservation motive, the behavioral outcome may not differ from what would be 




Given these considerations, one class of cosmological beliefs – beliefs in 
supernatural punishment for inappropriate environmental behavior – warrants special 
attention because such beliefs could affect an individual’s cost/benefit calculation in 
ways that reduce environmental impact. It may well be that without self-interested 
incentives conservation is unlikely; supernatural punishment may provide such an 
incentive. Previous research has demonstrated the efficacy of punishment for maintaining 
cooperation (Boyd et al., 2010; Fehr & Gächter, 2002), including in the context of 
common pool resource management (Gibson et al., 2005). Most of this research has 
focused on natural sources of punishment, but a growing body of evolutionarily-informed 
literature suggests that beliefs in moralizing and punishing supernatural agents can also 
promote cooperation (Atkinson & Bourrat 2011; Johnson & Krüger, 2004). Indeed, 
numerous ethnographers have noted informants’ expressions of fear of supernatural 
sanctions for “taking too much” from nature (e.g., Beckerman & Valentine, 1996; 
Dennis, 2004). Although Low (1996), using the Standard Cross Cultural Sample, found 
that societies that expressed beliefs in sacred prohibitions were no less likely to have 
degraded their environment, other studies have documented that sacred sites are more 
likely to have been conserved (Byers et al., 2001; Salick et al., 2007), and some scholars 
have argued for the importance of species and habitat taboos for conservation (Colding & 
Folke, 2001; McDonald, 1977). For example, the highland Maya perceive the forest “as 
an active agent capable of taking revenge against disrespectful or careless humans who 
enter this realm to harvest resources such as wild animals or construction materials” 






Before proceeding further, it is important to recognize that assigning the label of 
“sustainable” or “conservation” to particular actions has proven to be challenging (and 
politically controversial) in part because multiple interpretations of the same behavior are 
possible. The following example illustrates this challenge. Salmón (2000), himself a 
Rarámuri, described the Rarámuri concept of iwígara as the “total interconnectedness and 
integration of all life in the Sierra Madres, physical and spiritual” (p. 1328). He recounted 
an example of a Rarámuri elder who went to a rincón to collect a particular species of 
plant. Along the way, the elder encountered the same species of plant but chose not to 
harvest it. When prompted for an explanation, the elder suggested to Salmón that the 
iwígara was weak there because there were only a few plants, whereas in the rincón there 
were many plants and collecting them there was good “because thinning them out 
actually helps the iwígara in the other plants to strengthen” (Salmón, 2000, p. 1330). 
Concluding that the elder understood the ecological danger of harvesting from threatened 
populations even though he articulated it in terms of iwígara, Salmón (2000) explained 
that “Rarámuri land management represents a tradition of conservation that relies on a 
reciprocal relationship with nature in which the idea of iwígara becomes an affirmation 
of caretaking responsibilities and an assurance of sustainable subsistence and harvesting” 
(p. 1330). 
 An alternative interpretation of the elder’s behavior is that it reflects the most 
efficient course of action for him. From an efficiency standpoint, if a certain quantity of 
plants is desired, and the elder – who possesses local ecological knowledge – knows he 




plants only means that he must carry these plants a greater distance since he still intends 
to walk to the rincón in order to obtain the total quantity he desires. Thus, at least three 
perspectives are represented in this Rarámuri example: an emic perspective of iwígara, 
an etic perspective of conservation, and an alternative etic perspective of efficiency. 
Attempting to establish which perspective is “correct” would likely irritate existing 
theoretical divisions among anthropologists more than it would illuminate Rarámuri 
behavior – and no doubt a great deal of the discussion would hinge upon definitions: 
what is meant by “conservation” and “sustainable”? Since these semantic and conceptual 
issues have been well-covered elsewhere (see Alvard, 1994, 1998; Hames, 2007; Hunn et 
al., 2003; Nadasdy, 2005; Redford & Stearman, 1993; Smith & Wishnie, 2000), I provide 
only a summary here. 
The terms “conservation” and “sustainability” are often used interchangeably, but 
they have distinct connotations. Sustainability comes from the concept of maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY), which was developed for forestry and fishery management as a 
way to calculate the largest harvest sizes that could be taken over time without causing 
the stock to decline. It is possible to harvest resources at levels below MSY without 
having any explicit desire to do so (e.g., due to inefficient technology). This is sometimes 
called epiphenomenal conservation (sensu Hunn, 1982) because it is a byproduct of 
factors other than an explicit sustainability motive. Conservation implies an act – often 
restraint – that prevents environmental degradation and biodiversity loss. One of the 
most widely used definitions comes from Smith and Wishnie (2000): a conservation 
action or practice “should (a) prevent or mitigate resource depletion, species extirpation, 




Wishnie (2000) noted, this definition raises not only the problem of how to define 
operationally depletion or degradation, but also how to determine that a practice is in fact 
designed for conservation (for further problematizing of these definitional issues, see 
Hunn et al., 2003, and Nadasdy, 2005). 
 
The present study 
In order to avoid some of these problems of interpretation, the present study does 
not purport to establish whether a particular indigenous people practice sustainable or 
conservation behavior per se. Rather, this paper tests for an association between an 
individual’s cosmological beliefs and the quantity of wildlife biomass he or she harvests 
through hunting and fishing. The simple working assumption, then, is that the more 
wildlife a person harvests, the greater his or her environmental impact. In other words, 
the intracultural spectrum of both beliefs and behaviors is what is of interest. This 
approach follows from Snodgrass and Tiedje’s (2008) call to transcend the binary 
thinking that has characterized much of the research on indigenous peoples and 
conservation.   
Specifically, are individual differences in cosmological beliefs associated with 
individual differences in wildlife harvests? Using data collected among Miskitu 
horticulturalists in Nicaragua, three hypotheses were tested. First, people whose beliefs 
include notions of nonhuman personhood and interconnectedness with the natural world 
will harvest less wildlife biomass (hypothesis 1). Second, people who expect supernatural 
punishment from spirit guardians for overharvesting will harvest less wildlife biomass 




(operationalized here as beliefs in interconnectedness, nonhuman personhood, and 
punitive spirit guardians of nature – in other words, a combined measure of those used in 
each of the first two hypotheses) will harvest less wildlife biomass (hypothesis 3). 
 
Study area and population 
  The study took place in the Bosawas Biosphere Reserve of Nicaragua in two 
Miskitu villages located adjacent to each other within the indigenous territory Kipla Sait 
Tasbaika (KST). The local indigenous Miskitu and Mayangna of the region were not 
consulted prior to the Reserve’s creation (Kaimowitz et al., 2003), which was created in 
1991 – just as the Miskitu and Mayangna were returning home after many years as 
refugees during the Contra war of the 1980s (Stocks, 2003). Consequently, in defense of 
their land rights, the Miskitu and Mayangna solicited the assistance of nongovernmental 
organizations for the purposes of demarcating and mapping six indigenous territories 
(Stocks et al., 1998). The indigenous people of each territory also developed a set of 
natural resource management rules that they themselves would be responsible for 
enforcing (Stocks et al., 1998). After many years of struggle, common property land titles 
were granted to the indigenous territories in 2005 by the Nicaraguan state (Stocks et al., 
2007). Thus, the Miskitu are by no means naïve when it comes to the politics of natural 
resource management (see Chapter 2). However, the relationship between Miskitu 
cosmology and conservation has not (yet) been as extensively politicized as it has been 
for some other indigenous peoples. 
In terms of subsistence, the Miskitu of KST are sedentary swidden 




tomatoes, avocados, pejibaye, and other supplemental fruits. Key fish and game species 
include machaca, guapote, nine-banded armadillos, pacas, and agoutis. Hunting 
technology includes machetes, dogs, rifles, and occasionally, axes or lances. Fishing 
technology includes hook-and-line, nets (often mosquito nets), diving masks and simple 
harpoons, bow-and-arrow, and plant toxins. Women rarely hunt, but both men and 
women fish. However, only men fish with diving masks and varillas (simple rubber-band 
harpoons), a particularly efficient method in clear waters that are characteristic of the dry 
season (Koster 2007). Research conducted in KST during 2003-2005 as part of the St. 
Louis Zoo’s Proyecto Biodiversidad found that the two villages involved in the present 
study consumed 135.9 kg and 174.4 kg, respectively, of game biomass per household per 
year (Williams-Guillén et al., 2006), but animal husbandry of chickens, pigs, and cattle 
has been growing in importance due to government development projects.  After studying 
the multipronged subsistence strategy of the inhabitants of KST, Cordón and Toledo 
(2008) concluded that the diverse collection of subsistence practices functioned as a kind 
of “autochthonous conservation mechanism” (p. 44). Other possible autochthonous 
conservation mechanisms include traditional Miskitu beliefs about nature and the 
supernatural.   
 
Miskitu cosmology 
Nietschmann (1973) described the Miskitu world as having “a number of spirits, 
beliefs, and cultural constraints controlling or limiting the daily availability of many food 
resources” (p. 112). Frequently mentioned in the ethnographic literature are spirit 




“owner” or “master” (dawanka) of all the animals, although some plant and animal 
species – such as white-lipped peccaries and the Ceiba tree – have specific spirit owners 
(Conzemius, 1932; Cox, 1998; Jamieson, 2009). The owner of bodies of water and their 
inhabitants is liwa or sirena, a mermaid-like creature that seduces and drowns people 
(Cox, 1998, pp. 32-33; Dennis, 2004, pp. 212-213; Jamieson, 2009, p. 45; Wedel, 2009, 
p. 57). Indeed, lasa are to blame for much illness and death.  
In Miskitu cosmology, illness is viewed as a result of breaking a balance with the 
natural world and thereby angering lasa who punish the offender (Cox, 1998; Dennis, 
2004; Fagoth et al., 1998).  In the Caribbean coastal areas where many Miskitu men are 
lobster divers, decompression sickness is understood as punishment by liwa for taking 
too many lobsters (Cupples, 2012, p. 18; Herlihy, 2012, p. 146; see also Dunford et al., 
2002, p. 82). Similarly, because the Sisin (Ceiba) tree has a dawanka, cutting it is 
completely forbidden – and if you cut it you or your loved ones will be punished by 
sickness or death (Cox, 1998, p. 91). Fagoth et al. (1998) explicitly connected Miskitu 
cosmology, and in particular the belief in lasa, with living in harmony with nature: “If a 
person follows the basic rules of agreement with nature, it is certain he or she will carry 
on a healthy and happy life. Otherwise the Lasas or evil spirits will charge dearly for his 
or her habitual lawlessness”13 (p. 19). Dennis (2004) recounts a compelling example of 
the conservation potential of traditional Miskitu beliefs in lasa: “the swinta is the owner 
of the deer. He herds them with his whip and punishes hunters who kill too many deer. 
Casey tells me he has seen the swinta’s light at night in the brush, when he was deer 
hunting, and then realized he was killing too many deer and should be careful” (p. 212). 
                                                 
13 My translation of, “Si la persona sigue las reglas elementales de concordancia con la naturaleza, de 
seguro llevará una vida sana y feliz. De lo contrario los Lasas o malos espíritus cobrarán caro su desorden 




Miskitu beliefs in lasa have survived amidst contact with colonials, missionaries, 
foreign companies, the Nicaraguan government, and more recently, NGOs – but that is 
not to say that these beliefs have not changed as a result of contact. For example, liwa 
mairin (mairin means “woman” or “female”) is also known on the coast as the Merry 
Maid. The similarity between liwa mairin and English buccaneer tales of mermaids is 
apparent, and Herlihy (2002, p. 278) suggested that contact during colonial times 
between the Miskitu and buccaneers may have given rise to the liwa folklore. Even 
though the Miskitu language is full of English and Spanish loan words; bedtime stories 
told to children about Tibang, the trickster rabbit, probably are of West African origin 
(Dennis, 2004, p. 276); and most Miskitu self-identify as Christian (especially Moravian), 
the Miskitu have not wholly abandoned their traditional beliefs, including beliefs in lasa: 
“The Christian concept of Satan and the indigenous belief in lasas are often equated 
today. Both words are used interchangeably in conversations, and both are considered to 
refer to real, animistic beings” (Helms, 1971, p. 187; see also Dennis, 2004, pp. 214-215, 
and Minks, 2007, p. 9). 
Critical to this study, the Miskitu people’s complex cultural history and tendency 
towards “cosmopolitanism” (Minks, 2007, 2010) have likely generated more intracultural 
variation in cosmological beliefs than would be found among more isolated groups. This 
within-culture variation is necessary for an analysis contingent upon individual 
differences in beliefs – and regardless of the origins of people’s beliefs, the question of 
the relationship between a person’s cosmological beliefs and his or her foraging behavior 






Data were collected during fieldwork in two adjacent villages (approximately 321 
residents in total) in Kipla Sait Tasbaika from February 2010 through early January 2011. 
This study was conducted as part of a larger research project that also evaluated the 
efficacy of the local common property institutions (see Chapters 2 and 3), and the 
villages were selected primarily for their proximity to a third, much larger, village that 
was the seat of territorial governance. The process of informed consent involved gaining 
approval from local leaders and communities during community meetings in addition to 
individual-level consent. Monetary compensation was given for participation. All 
households participated in the study, and participants included adults (18 years and older) 
residing in the two study villages during the study period.  
The study design included semistructured and structured interviews, measurement 
of wildlife harvests, and participant observation. The behavioral data used in the 
following analyses come from the period from early May 2010 through late December 
2010. The survey data come from a survey carried out from mid-June through July, 2010, 
and another carried out from late November 2010 through early January 2011 (the 
cosmological questions were a part of this second survey). I worked with two Spanish-
Miskitu interpreters from one of the villages. (Spanish is a second language for many of 
the villagers – but levels of fluency vary widely.) These interpreters were also key 
informants and their insights about Miskitu culture were immensely helpful in producing 
culturally intelligible questions. The profundity of the topics explored in this research 
does not lend itself to quick or easy “translation.” Thus, the translation of some questions 




meanings of the words used. As necessary, these conversations were expanded to include 
two bilingual, local Miskitu high school teachers (also participants in the study). The 
Miskitu translations were then taken to another highly educated Miskitu in a neighboring 
community who had lived in the Spanish-speaking Pacific side of Nicaragua for about 30 
years. He back-translated the Miskitu into Spanish, and any needed changes were made 
to eliminate ambiguities and discrepancies as well as to achieve conceptual equivalence.  
 
Wildlife harvests 
To help monitor and measure wildlife harvests, I hired and trained several local 
Miskitu men and women from the villages to work as research assistants. I provided them 
with field equipment and data forms and for the most part they worked independently to 
monitor the comings and goings of villagers with the goal of conducting a brief interview 
and weighing any captured fish or game with a hanging digital scale.14 The assistants 
would periodically visit each household throughout the course of a day (as not all houses 
were visible simultaneously) from 6:00 AM to 7:00 PM, Mondays through Saturdays, 
and from 6:00 AM to 8:00 AM on Sundays. Participants either waited for an assistant to 
come by to weigh the catch or actively sought out the assistants or me. The communities 
were very cooperative and assistants generally knew when participants went hunting or 
fishing and could closely monitor their return. Because Sunday was widely recognized in 
the communities as a day for going to church, participating in community meetings, 
resting, and socializing, very little hunting and fishing activity took place on Sundays. As 
                                                 
14 The communities were quite familiar with this sort of work because a previous project conducted by the 
St. Louis Zoo in 2003-2004 also hired local field assistants to collect similar information (see Williams-





such, the assistants only visited each household in the morning to weigh what had been 
caught the night before; the common practice of hunting on Saturdays in order to have 
meat on Sundays meant that hunters sometimes returned late at night (especially if 
hunting by flashlight). However, occasionally men would in fact go hunting on Sunday, 
and I would perform the interview and measurements.  
For each trip during which fish or game were caught, the following variables were 
recorded: time of departure and return; purpose of the trip; who went on the trip; what 
hunting or fishing technology each person on the trip brought; the species and weights of 
animals caught; and to whom the actual act of “the kill” or “the catch” was attributed. For 
example, several men may go on a hunt together, but only one is usually recognized as 
“the killer” (i.e., the one who literally takes the life). Species identification was 
performed by the field assistant, often in collaboration with others present. In most cases 
the sex, age (juvenile or adult), and count were also recorded. In the case of some fish 
species, sex and age were difficult to discern, and in some harvests the fish were so small 
and the quantity so large that for the sake of not overburdening the study participants 
(patiently waiting to prepare the food), the pescaditos were weighed collectively.  
 
Cosmological beliefs 
To construct a set of questions (Table 6) to tap into indigenous cosmological 
beliefs of interconnectedness and nonhuman personhood, I drew on the ethnographic 
literature on indigenous cosmologies as well as the psychological literature on human-
environment relationships. The Connectedness with Nature Scale (Mayer & Frantz, 





Measures of “pro-conservation” cosmological beliefs and participant responses (n = 122) 
 Question Yes (%) Example comment 
1 Do you think that plants and 
animals have as much right to 
exist as humans do?a  
95.1  People have rights separate from 
animals and trees. (Maura)  
2 Sometimes does it make you 
sad to see the virgin forest 
cleared for agriculture or 
pasture?bc 
50.0 I clear forest because I have to plant 
food and survive, but part of me is sad to 
do so. (Cornelio) 
3 Do animals seem almost 
human sometimes?b  
40.2 Some animals have more sense than 
some people. (Camilo)  
 
4 Do you think that plants and 
animals have some kinship 
with humans?d  
51.6 I work with the finca modelo [model 
farming program run by an NGO], and 
they gave a workshop and told us that 
we should greet the plants in our fields. 
But I don’t believe plants can hear 
because my parents never taught me 
this. (Tomás) 
5 Do you believe that animals 
and trees have souls?  
71.9e Animals yes, but trees no. (Constanza, 
Gretal, Lily, Tamira) 
 
6 Do you believe that some 
animals and some trees have 
owners that are spirits like lasa 
or duhindu?c 
56.6 Old beliefs from before the Bible; now 
there is none of that. (Diego) 
7 Do you feel sad when you see 
animals suffering?  
86.1 One time I was with my husband 
hunting and saw a guatusa struggling to 
give birth and it was sad. (Plora) 
a Adapted from the New Ecological Paradigm Scale (Dunlap et al., 2000). 
b Adapted from the Ecocentric, Anthropocentric, and Environmental Apathy Scale 
(Thompson & Barton, 1994). 
c To improve overall alpha for the index of cosmological beliefs in interconnectedness 
and nonhuman personhood, this item was dropped. See text for details. 
d Adapted from the Connectedness with Nature Scale (Mayer & Frantz, 2004). 





Barton, 1994), and the New Ecological Paradigm Scale (Dunlap et al., 2000) were 
especially helpful in this process. However, since these scales were designed for Western 
populations, only a few items were ultimately used (denoted in Table 6) – and these were 
slightly modified (e.g., to fit a “yes/no” response format). Also, whenever participants 
elaborated upon their yes/no response (as nearly half the respondents did during this 
portion of the interview) these comments were recorded. 
 To assess expectations of supernatural punishment, short vignettes (Table 7) were 
used. Participants were asked whether they thought an imaginary character would receive 
punishment from lasa for “taking too much” of species commonly believed by Miskitu to 
have spirit owners: the Ceiba tree (Sisin), white-lipped peccary (wari), and fish (inska). 
The specific punishment expected was also recorded. Prior to constructing these 
vignettes, semistructured interviews were conducted with local elders in order to get a 
sense of current, local beliefs about lasa and to ascertain whether the specific details of 
some of the examples given in the ethnographic literature were relevant in this context. 
 
Control variables 
In order to control for participants’ absences from the community during which 
observational behavioral data were not collected, three sources of information were used 
to create a code for participants’ degree of absenteeism (where higher values reflect 
greater absenteeism): a registry of trips away from the villages (kept beginning in late 
August), participant recalls of trips taken, and my general ethnographic observations 
throughout the fieldwork period.15 Since the more mouths there are to feed, the more food  
                                                 
15 Two participants turned 18 after the first survey but before the second. Thus, they began participating in 








Measures of expectations of supernatural punishment for overharvesting (n = 122) 
 
Vignettes 
Question following each 
vignette 
Punish (%) 
Some people say that the tree 
called Ceiba has an owner that 
is a spirit or lasa. Alejandro 
cut a large Ceiba tree.  
What is the spirit going to do to 
Alejandro/Henry/Rodolfo? 
56.2a 
Some people say that the 
white-lipped peccary has an 
owner that is a spirit. Henry is 
hunting when he encounters a 
bunch of white-lipped 
peccaries. He kills 10 white-
lipped peccaries.  
59.0 
Some people say that the fish 
have an owner, liwa mairin. 
Rodolfo is a good fisher and 
always takes lots of fish. For 
example, he caught more than 
50 lbs of fish in one day.  
42.6 






                                                                                                                                                 
I coded their absenteeism as if they had been absent during this period in order to deal with their missing 




is needed, I calculated the average number of consumers per meal in the household using 
data from weekly diaries kept by each household that recorded the number of people 
(above 2 years old) who ate each meal each day of the week (visitors eating in the 
household were included in this tally). Wealth was considered an important control 
variable because wealthier people might have less of a need to hunt and fish themselves 
(either because they can purchase fish and game or because they own more domesticated 
animals). Alternatively, wealthier individuals might simply be able to afford better 
hunting and fishing tools and thus wealth could have a positive effect on harvest sizes. 
Following Godoy et al. (2007), wealth was assessed by asking participants how many of 
38 different durable items (e.g., livestock, tools, gadgets) they owned personally, 
multiplying the quantity of each item by its local price, and summing the products to 
create an estimate of individual wealth. Because these data were highly right-skewed, a 
square root transformation was used and the term “wealth” hereafter refers to this 
transformed variable. Finally, formal education, plausibly inversely related to 
supernatural beliefs, was coded such that higher values reflect greater education.  
 All statistical analyses were performed using R 3.1.0. 
 
Results 
Participants included 75 men and 70 women of whom the majority identified with 
the Moravian Church. Although a concerted effort was made to interview all adults from 
the two villages, inevitably some residents were not interviewed either for the first or 
second long interview due to absence from the community (e.g., visiting relatives) around 




second interview, the data analyzed in this paper include a subset of the 145 participants 
(i.e., n = 122). However, at least one adult from each household (total households at start 
of study = 44; total at end of study = 49) is included in this subset. The two villages did 
not significantly differ in INP cosmology or expectations of supernatural punishment, but 
a nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test showed that they did differ in the amount of 
wildlife biomass harvested (W = 2251.5, p = .02). Therefore, village was included as a 
control in the following regression analyses.  
 
Quantitative analysis 
Constructing the variables 
Cosmological beliefs of interconnectedness and nonhuman personhood  
(INP cosmology) 
Most of the time participants responded to the INP cosmological questions (Table 
6) with a clear “yes” or “no” response (where yes = 1, no = 0), but occasionally their 
responses lay somewhere in-between (e.g., domesticated animals have a kinship with 
humans but wild animals do not; animals have souls but trees do not). For the purposes of 
the analyses here, these kinds of qualified responses were lumped with the “no” 
responses in order to best isolate those with very inclusive ontologies. With these data an 
initial index was constructed for INP cosmological beliefs by summing responses to the 7 
items in Table 6 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.54). Dropping items 2 and 7 improved overall 
alpha (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.63). Thus the responses to the remaining 5 items were 
summed to create a final index of INP cosmological beliefs (possible values = 0-5).16 
                                                 
16 Although a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.63 might be considered low for scale construction, the aim of the index 




Descriptive statistics showed this index captured intracultural variation (see Table 8). 
 
Expectations of supernatural punishment from spirit guardians 
 Following each vignette, I asked participants what they thought the spirit would 
do to the character in the vignette (see Table 7). The most common forms of expected 
punishment were that either the character or his family member would become sick, be 
taken or killed, or become lost (i.e., in the forest or water). Sometimes people thought the 
character would suffer some combination of the above – or perhaps one or the other of 
them. But for each of the three vignettes, 44%, 41%, and 57% respectively, thought that 
the character would receive no supernatural punishment. After coding responses to each 
vignette as 0 = no punishment and 1 = some form of punishment, I summed the three 
answers to create an index of expected supernatural punishment (possible values = 0-3; 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82). Again, descriptive statistics showed this index captured 
intracultural variation (see Table 8). 
Age was unrelated to INP cosmology, but older individuals were less likely to 
believe in supernatural punishment (r = -0.36, p < .001). Neither sex nor formal 
education was associated with INP cosmology or expectations of supernatural 
punishment. 
 
Combined cosmological measure 
These two indices – expectations of supernatural punishment and INP 
cosmological beliefs – were positively, but not strongly, correlated (r = 0.25, p < .01). To  
                                                                                                                                                 
relationships rather than a very narrowly construed factor. Thus, the index trade-offs some internal 






Definitions and summary statistics of variables 
 
Variable Definition n Mean SD Range 
Dependent       
 Wildlife biomass 
harvested 
Total weighed biomass 
(kg) of mammals, fishes, 
birds, and reptiles 
harvested by participant 
from May 2 through 
December 23, 2010 
145 8.90 20.49 0-173 
    Harvests by  men  see above 75 14.31 26.59 0-173 
    Harvests by women see above 70 3.10 7.23 0-
54.92 





Sum of responses (0 = 
no, 1 = yes) to items 1, 
3, 4, 5, and 7 in Table 1 
121 3.44 1.32 0-5 
(H2) Supernatural 
punishment 
Belief that character in 3 
vignettes would receive 
supernatural punishment 
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 





Sum of standardized 
responses for INP 
cosmology and expected 
supernatural punishment 
120 0.01 1.58 -3.85-
2.3 
Control      
 Village (dummy)  145 0.79 0.41 0-1 
 Sex 0 = female, 1 = male 145 0.52 0.50 0-1 
 Age Age in years 142 33.47 14.90 18-78 
 Absenteeism Absence from 
community, where 0 = 
no absence, 1 = absent 1-
15 days, 2 = absent 16-
30 days, 3 = absent 31-
60 days, 4 = absent more 
than 60 days 







Table 8 continued 
 
Variable Definition n Mean SD Range 
 Wealth Quantity of 38 durable 
items owned by 
participant, multiplied by 
each item’s local price, 
and summed 
137 8545 10589 8-
57152 
 Formal education Maximum  formal 
education of participant 
143 6.59 3.73 0-13 
 Number of consumers Average number of 
consumers (>2 years 
old) per meal in 
participant’s household 





















create a more holistic measure of “proconservation” cosmologies, I converted the two 
indices to z-scores and summed them.  
 
Wildlife harvests 
 The simplifying assumption taken here is that the more wildlife biomass taken, 
the greater the environmental impact. Kilograms harvested of mammals, fishes, birds, 
and reptiles were summed across the study period for each participant to create a measure 
of total animal biomass harvested. Because these data were highly skewed to the right 
(see Table 8), I performed a log-transformation to improve normality prior to using 
parametric statistics. In analyses using the full sample in which the dependent variable 
contained zeroes, I first added 1 to avoid taking the log of 0. Inspection of residuals for 
the multiple regression analyses below indicated that this transformation improved 
normality of their distribution.  




 Taking the sample as a whole, multiple linear regression analyses showed that 
individuals with greater expectation of supernatural punishment as well as those with 
more “proconservation” cosmologies (i.e., the combined measure) harvested significantly 
less wildlife biomass, and there was a trend towards a similar negative effect for INP 
cosmology (Models 1, 2, and 3, Table 9). These regression analyses included village, sex, 






Multiple regression results showing relationship between cosmology measures and log-




(n = 110) 
Model 2 
(n = 111) 
Model 3 
(n = 110) 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
(H1) INP cosmology -0.18† 
(0.09) 
       ___        ___ 
(H2) Expectations of 
supernatural punishment 
       ___ -0.19* 
(0.09) 
       ___ 
(H3) Combined measure of 
“proconservation” cosmology 


















































Adjusted R2 0.22 0.22 0.23 
F 4.77 4.89 5.15 







variables. Excluding individuals with standardized residuals greater than 2.5 eliminated 
the statistical significance (alpha = .05) of the relationship between harvest size 
(dependent variable) and expectations of supernatural punishment and the combined 
measure of “proconservation” cosmological beliefs (see Appendix). However, these 
outliers – 2 men and 1 woman (from different households) who had the highest harvest 
sizes for their sex – are arguably legitimate cases that should be included. These 
individuals did not believe in supernatural punishment, and they only held two out of five 
beliefs in interconnectedness and nonhuman personhood.  
 Significant results that were not contingent upon outlier inclusion were found 
when the analysis included only those participants who had harvest sizes greater than 
zero (i.e., 80% of 122 people). Among this subset, INP cosmology and the combined 
measure of “proconservation” cosmological beliefs – but not expectations of supernatural 
punishment – were significantly associated with harvest sizes. Specifically, those whose 
cosmologies reflected notions of nonhuman personhood and interconnectedness with 
nature harvested less wildlife biomass (Model 1, Table 10; Figure 2). Although there was 
a trend towards a negative relationship between expectations of supernatural punishment 
and harvest size, this relationship did not approach statistical significance (Model 2, 
Table 10; Figure 3). The combined measure also significantly related to harvest size such 
that those with more “proconservation” cosmologies harvested less wildlife (Model 3, 
Table 10; Figure 4). There was 1 individual (not the same as those mentioned above) with 
standardized residuals less than -2.5 in each of these models; excluding him increased the 
magnitude of the negative effect of the cosmological variables (and also eliminated the 






Multiple regression results showing relationship between cosmology measures and log-




(n = 90) 
Model 2 
(n = 91) 
Model 3 
(n = 90) 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
(H1) INP cosmology -0.30* 
(0.13) 
       ___        ___ 
(H2) Expectations of 
supernatural punishment 
       ___ -0.21 
(0.13) 
       ___ 
(H3) Combined measure of 
“proconservation” cosmology 



















































Adjusted R2 0.26 0.24 0.27 
F 4.98 4.52 5.02 
† p < .10; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 








Figure 2. Partial residual plot showing the relationship between beliefs in 
interconnectedness and nonhuman personhood (INP cosmology) and wildlife biomass 
harvested (logarithmic scale), controlling for village, sex, age, absenteeism, wealth, 
formal education, and number of consumers, and including only people whose harvest 














Figure 3. Partial residual plot showing the relationship between beliefs in supernatural 
punishment for overharvesting and wildlife biomass harvested (logarithmic scale), 
controlling for village, sex, age, absenteeism, wealth, formal education, and number of 
















Figure 4. Partial residual plot showing the relationship between “proconservation” 
cosmological beliefs (i.e., the combined measure of beliefs in interconnectedness, 
nonhuman personhood, and punitive spirit guardians) and wildlife biomass harvested 
(logarithmic scale), controlling for village, sex, age, absenteeism, wealth, formal 
education, and number of consumers, and including only people whose harvest size was 








Since generally only men hunted but both men and women fished, I also looked 
separately at men and women (Table 11). Because several control variables had been 
found not to be significantly related to harvest size in the multivariate models (see Table 
5), these were not included here in order to increase degrees of freedom. The results show 
that men, but not women, who have cosmological beliefs of interconnectedness and 
nonhuman personhood harvested less wildlife (Table 11, Model 1). No significant effect 
was found for expectations of supernatural punishment or the combined measure of 
“proconservation” cosmological beliefs for either men or women; although, directionality 
of their beta coefficients was negative, as expected, in all models except the model of 
men’s expectations of supernatural punishment (however, excluding one outlier changed 
the sign to the expected direction).  
Given the relationship between cosmology and harvest size among men, I 
explored whether men with more beliefs in interconnectedness and nonhuman 
personhood went on fewer foraging trips17 or harvested less wildlife biomass per trip than 
other men.18 Looking at the full sample of men, and controlling for education, men with 
more INP beliefs did not go on significantly fewer trips (partial rs = -0.15, p > .10, n = 
61) or harvest significantly less per trip than other men (partial rs = -0.20, p > .10, n = 
58). However, focusing on the subsample of men whose harvest size was greater than 
zero, and controlling for education, men with more beliefs in interconnectedness and 
                                                 
17
 “Foraging trip” refers to any excursion on which wild faunal resources, including not only vertebrates but 
also invertebrates, were killed or collected by any member of the foraging party. Not all foraging trips were 
intentional hunting or fishing trips; sometimes people encountered wildlife in the course of other activities 
(e.g., bathing or weeding a garden) and opportunistically captured the animal. I have no record of foraging 
trips that were complete failures (i.e., no wild faunal resources were acquired by any member of the 
foraging party).  
18 In this study, the focus is on the actual kills attributed to an individual. However, if a person went on a 
hunting or fishing trip as a “helper,” then he or she would typically receive a portion of the catch even if he 
or she was not directly responsible for it. Thus the harvest-per-trip calculation may over- or under-estimate 






Multiple regression results showing sex differences in the relationship between cosmology measures and log-transformed kg of 
wildlife biomass harvested (dependent variable) for the subsample 
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Adjusted R2 0.08 0.12 -0.03 0.20 -0.01 0.16 
F 2.51 2.84 0.46 4.58 0.91 3.59 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 







nonhuman personhood harvested significantly less wildlife biomass per trip (partial rs =   
-0.33, p < .05, n = 53).  
 
Qualitative analysis 
The Miskitu people of this study varied in their perceptions of a clear ontological 
distinction between humans and nature. Fifty-two percent of respondents thought that 
plants and animals share some kind of kinship with humans, 40% thought animals seem 
almost human sometimes, and 72% believe that plants and animals have souls (Table 6). 
Yet, near perfect consensus (95%) was obtained regarding whether plants and animals 
have as much right to exist as humans. It would seem then that Miskitu people believe in 
this right in a very fundamental way that is independent of their particular ontologies of 
kinship and personhood. However, because such survey responses can be viewed with 
skepticism (e.g., How do respondents understand the questions? Do they feel comfortable 
enough to answer openly? What does a “yes” or “no” really mean?), a closer examination 
of the elaborations that many interviewees gave following their responses to the 
structured cosmological questions is especially valuable. These data form the foundation 
for the following analysis, which also incorporates information from other parts of the 
formal interviews as well as informal conversations throughout the research period. The 
perspectives presented not only illustrate the ways that people reflect upon and make 
meaning of their beliefs but also validate the measures used in the quantitative analyses 
and develop a fuller context for interpretation of the quantitative results.  
As just mentioned, the question about whether animals seem almost human 




(but see below), several people’s comments indicated that their beliefs were akin to pet 
owners in the U.S. who see human-like qualities in their pets. For example, Ariana19, who 
thought that sometimes animals did indeed seem “almost human,” recalled an experience 
from her youth when she worked as a cook for laborers harvesting tunu. When the men 
left for work, she and another woman stayed behind and “a wakling [white-faced 
monkey] came and saw the [other] woman in her underwear and wanted to grab her as if 
he were a man!” In contrast to Ariana, Cornelio thought that animals did not ever seem 
like people. He explained, “when we encounter animals, they run from us.” I asked him if 
he thought that people would not run, and he replied, “no, they’d come over and chat 
with us about how to solve a problem or something.” Surely the most existential response 
I heard came from a young man named Tomás, who observed that, “the animals walk 
about and eat and do not think about the hour of death. Therefore they are not like people 
– they are less.”  
By comparison, asking whether people thought of plants and animals as kindred 
seemed to evoke less literal anthropomorphizing and more reflection on reciprocal 
relationships.  Several respondents pointed out that trees and animals help people and 
therefore they are “like family.” Winston expressed this mutualistic, kin-like relationship 
in two languages by making explicit reference to pana pana, the Miskitu 
conceptualization of cooperation and reciprocity (see Helms 1971: 129-132; Coe & 
Anderson 1997: 177), and then explaining in Spanish “juntos sobrevivimos” (“together 
we survive”). Even though 48% of respondents did not think in such relational terms, 
86% of respondents felt sad when they saw animals suffering, suggesting that empathy 
was not necessarily reserved for humans and nonhuman kindred. However, a few people 
                                                 




articulated a distinction between domesticated and wild animals. For example, Gretal said 
that she was sad when her domesticated animals suffer, but not when wild animals suffer. 
One interpretation is that Gretal and those that think like her care about the suffering of 
their domesticated animals because of obvious self-interest – but another, not mutually 
incompatible, interpretation is that the close interdependence of domesticates and people 
fosters greater empathy through an on-going and personal relationship.  
The most inclusive ontological category to emerge from the interviews is that of 
sôlka20 (soul): 72% of respondents thought that animals and trees have souls. Four people 
said that only animals, not trees, have souls. When Maura said specifically that daiwan 
nani have souls, I asked her if she also thought that dus nani (trees/plants) have them. She 
thought pensively for a minute and then said that because they breathe air “they too have 
sôlka.” Sulan, a quiet-tempered elder, explained to me that “the trees have a small hole 
inside and when they are cut, the souls escape.” Maura and Sulan agreed that trees have 
souls but what this meant to each of them differed: Maura emphasized the materiality of 
the soul through its connection to bodily function, whereas Sulan emphasized the 
immateriality of souls through their separability from their bodies. Winston, who thought 
like Maura that respiration marked the presence of souls, distinguished between breath 
and life. A bilingual woman named Gladys, on the other hand, did not identify breath as 
the most salient marker of sôlka, but rather the heart. Gladys said in response to my 
                                                 
20 Although there are translations in the ethnographic literature of lilka as the Miskitu word for “soul” 
(Dennis, 2004; Minks, 2007), the word has multiple meanings. As noted by Jamieson (2008) – and as I 
heard for myself in the field – lilka not only refers to “the spirits of the living,” but also “shadow” and 
“photograph” (pp. 562-563). Sôlka also means “soul” (Melgara Brown, 2008), but its evident English 
origin implies an association with Christian notions of the soul. A discussion with key 
informants/interpreters about the distinction between lilka and sôlka suggested that sôlka was thought of as 
something inherent to humans but not necessarily other life forms. Thus, using sôlka would not only 
provide greater conceptual equivalence across participants (given the multiple meanings of lilka) but would 





question about sôlka that “sí, tienen vida” (“yes, they have life”). Not sure if her use of 
the Spanish word vida corresponded to the Spanish word alma (soul), I pressed her 
further: “well, do they have almas?” She explained that indeed they do because “palms 
have corazones [hearts] so they have souls.” I asked her where the souls of humans 
reside. She said in the heart. If souls are the animating principle of living beings, then it is 
perhaps unsurprising that so many people thought nonhumans had souls; on the other 
hand, it is interesting that the degree of consensus that was seen for the question 
regarding the right to exist was not obtained for the question about souls. In light of this, 
it seems that for the Miskitu, the right to exist is not predicated upon the possession of a 
soul.     
As prevalent as it was, the belief in the right of nonhumans to exist did not seem 
associated with feelings of obliged self-sacrifice for the well-being of these nonhuman 
others. This sentiment was well-expressed by Cornelio who said (with laughter) of plants 
and animals: “they have the right [to exist], but they have to lose that right when we are 
hungry!” It may be sad to have to clear forest for agriculture or pasture – as 51% of 
respondents expressed – but people must live. The primacy of human well-being emerged 
in Diego’s reflection about forest clearance. An elder and avid hunter, Diego mused that 
“for agriculture it is good [to clear land] but for pasture it is bad because the wild animals 
run far away – where are they going to live?” His implied point that agriculture does not 
cause animals “to run” is corroborated by data on hunting returns for at least some 
species in agricultural plots (Koster 2008b). Therefore, Diego’s differential concern about 
the effects of deforestation on wildlife reflects not only a cultural devaluation of 




Like many other indigenous cultures, there was a recurring “no waste” ethic. This 
was expressed in the context of land use as well as hunting. Leaving meat to spoil in the 
forest was considered a very improper act. For example, Iker, another avid hunter, 
thought that it was fine if a hunter killed 4 tapir during one hunting trip as long as he did 
not leave the meat to spoil. If he brought the meat back to the village for sharing and 
selling, then that was good. For the Miskitu, “wasting” seems to be defined in 
anthropocentric terms. This contrasts with Pierotti’s (2011) view that leaving carcasses 
behind (e.g., after chasing buffalo over cliffs) is not necessarily “wasteful” if viewed 
from an ecological perspective rather than an environmental perspective (because other 
organisms consume the buffalo remains and nutrients and energy cycle through the 
ecosystem). In addition to avoiding waste, the continued use of resources, an important 
principle in many indigenous cultures (e.g., Berkes, 2008, p. 113), was also expressed by 
Iker when he said, “God made [the forest] for people to use. If people do not clear it and 
use it, that’s bad.” His emphasis on God creating nature for human use takes on a 
decidedly Christian worldview with the implication of dominion over nature.  
The syncretism between Christianity and traditional indigenous beliefs was most 
evident when it came to beliefs about spirit owners and supernatural punishment. Two 
examples are especially striking. The first comes from a man named Herman who told 
me that he knows there are “people of the river” (liwa) but he does not believe that they 
are owners of the fish. He explained: “according to the Bible, these people come from the 
cielo [sky or heaven]. There was a war and God kicked them out of heaven and they took 
up in various places. They are evil spirits. The Bible explains this.” The second example 




A man went hunting with a shotgun and killed wari [white-lipped peccary]. Later 
he was found hung from a tree with his mouth and chest cut open, his shotgun 
flung afar. The people took him down and buried him. But this was not the doing 
of lasa. Rather, it was the doing of God because the man had been hunting on 
Sunday. For a lack of respect of Sunday as a day of rest, God punished him.  
  
These examples vividly illustrate the merging of traditional beliefs in lasa with Christian 
concepts. Both Herman and Torlin had answered “no” to the earlier question asking if 
they believed some trees and animals have spirit owners or lasa. Given the evident 
difference in their later comments, in the case of Torlin, it was easy to take him at his 
word because there was no apparent discrepancy across his responses. In the case of 
Herman, I was concerned that his earlier “no” response was due to a desire to give a 
“good Christian answer.” My concern was both validated and allayed when Herman 
explained that the character from the liwa mairin vignette would not be punished for 
taking too many fish because “if you believe in evil spirits, you will see them. If you 
don’t believe, you won’t. You have to have faith that there are no evil spirits.” Herman 
was thus giving a good Christian answer and simultaneously creating a reality in which 
there are no evil spirits. Dennis (2004) heard a similar “postmodern philosophy” (p. 215) 
in the Miskitu coastal community of Awastara. Consequently, I interpreted Herman’s 
seemingly inconsistent (from a positivist perspective) responses as reflections of his own 
cosmological understanding of reality.  
 Finally, several people explained their lack of belief in supernatural punishment 
as the result of their own lived experience through which they had learned that they could 
cut a large Ceiba or harvest large quantities of fish and nothing would happen to them. 
The role of individual learning in people’s beliefs may help explain why older people 




lived long enough to have violated these norms and observed the lack of consequences. 
That the stories are evidently still being told to younger generations may reflect cultural 
pride as much as cautionary tales about the consequences of improper behavior.  
 
Discussion 
 The results of this study among the Miskitu provide initial quantitative evidence 
at the individual-level of the direct link between people’s cosmological beliefs and their 
observed environmentally-significant behavior, namely hunting and fishing harvests. 
Specifically, controlling for other factors, those individuals who held more 
“proconservation” cosmological beliefs (i.e., the combined measure that included beliefs 
in nonhuman personhood, interconnectedness between humans and the rest of nature, and 
spirit guardians that punish for overharvesting) harvested less wildlife biomass, 
supporting hypothesis 3 (Model 3 in Tables 4 and 5; see also Figure 3). INP cosmology 
and expectations of supernatural punishment – the components of the combined measure 
just mentioned – were found to be independently associated with lower wildlife harvests 
in the subsample and the full sample, respectively (Model 1, Table 5; Model 2, Table 4). 
Although the relationship between the cosmological variables and harvest size in the full 
sample was sensitive to outliers, the relationship was robust to outlier exclusion for the 
subsample with individuals whose harvest sizes were greater than zero. Looking at men 
and women separately, INP cosmology was associated with lower harvest size for men 
only; neither expectations of supernatural punishment nor the combined measure had a 
significant association with harvest size for either sex (Table 6). The magnitude of the 




holding absenteeism and formal education constant, when the number of beliefs in 
interconnectedness and nonhuman personhood increase by 1, wildlife biomass harvests 
decrease by 46%. The lack of a relationship between INP cosmology and harvest size 
among women could be due, at least in part, to lower variance among women’s harvest 
sizes.  
An important caveat when interpreting these results is that only particular 
cosmological beliefs were examined (see Tables 1 and 2) – and two of these beliefs were 
not included in the final index of INP cosmological beliefs due to low intercorrelations 
among the items (but see footnote 9). For the dropped question about forest clearance, the 
problem was most certainly with the question itself because it referenced both agriculture 
and pasture – yet these two land-uses are thought of very differently by Miskitu people 
because agriculture is the foundation of their subsistence way of life, whereas pasture is 
used for cattle-ranching, still primarily a mestizo practice. For the dropped question about 
belief in lasa, participants sometimes gave an answer to this question that differed from 
their subsequent answers to the supernatural punishment questions, implying that their 
response to one or the other was an inaccurate indicator of their actual beliefs. However, 
as noted in the qualitative analysis, some interviewees explained their answers in a very 
postmodern fashion: you will encounter spirits if you believe in them, but not if you do 
not. It is tempting then to interpret the low intercorrelation of this item with the five index 
items as the statistical footprint of this postmodern thinking. 
Beliefs in interconnectedness and nonhuman personhood were only weakly 
correlated with expectations of supernatural punishment, suggesting that they do not tap 




cosmology was more robustly associated with lower wildlife harvests than were beliefs in 
supernatural punishment. These two constructs also appear to differ in the degree to 
which they are modified through real-world feedback. Age was unrelated to INP 
cosmology, but negatively related to expectations of supernatural punishment. An 
argument made by Smith (1991, p. 24) about foraging offers some illumination as to why 
this might be so: because the payoffs to foraging are immediate and repeated, it is a 
domain in which cumulative experience can motivate an individual to deviate from 
cultural norms. In the present context, several Miskitu participants commented that they 
had taken large quantities of fish or cut a large Ceiba tree and never received any 
punishment from lasa. So it seems that a belief about a causal relationship between x and 
y is readily challenged by the lived experience of x without y.  
Regarding the supernatural punishment hypothesis put forward by Johnson and 
Krüger (2004) that belief in supernatural punishment facilitates public goods cooperation, 
the present study found no statistically significant support not dependent on the inclusion 
of three outliers. Nevertheless, negative trends were found more often than not, and it is 
possible that this study simply lacked the statistical power to demonstrate a significant 
effect. On the other hand, it could be that the examples in the vignettes were so extreme 
that it was easy for participants to say that the character would be punished even if they 
felt that they themselves would not be punished for harvesting at high (but not that high) 
levels. Another possible explanation is that regardless of such beliefs people tend to 
discount the future. Perhaps controlling for either time preference or inclinations towards 
risk-taking behavior would reveal a stronger relationship between expectations of 




traditional Miskitu beliefs and Christianity has muddied the relationship between beliefs 
in supernatural punishment and foraging behavior. Recall the story told by Torlin in 
which a wari hunter was killed for hunting on a Sunday, a Christian day of rest. Although 
Torlin believed in supernatural punishment for improper hunting behavior, the 
punishment came from God, not lasa. Future research could parse these issues. 
The results of the INP cosmology analysis suggest that ontological beliefs of 
interconnectedness and nonhuman personhood can facilitate cooperation towards 
commons management; punishment is not necessarily the integral ingredient. For 
example, in a study among Buddhist mushroom harvesters in Bhutan, Brooks (2010) 
examined the role of “other-regarding” orientation (arguably a form of 
interconnectedness) in determining individuals’ willingness to show harvest restraint. He 
found individuals who were more “other-regarding” – a highly valued principle in 
Buddhism – were more likely to express a willingness to reduce their harvest to ensure 
sustainability. Psychological studies have similarly shown the importance of self-
transcendence for cooperation (Sagiv et al., 2011) – even cooperation in a hypothetical 
commons dilemma (Arnocky et al., 2007). It seems plausible that INP cosmology might 
relate to other measures of self-transcendence.    
Finally, since this study did not evaluate sustainability (as in MSY) or 
conservation (as in restraint; see Alvard, 1993) per se, the question of the effect of 
indigenous cosmologies specifically on sustainability or conservation was not addressed 
here. Nevertheless, to the extent that harvesting less wildlife biomass can be generally 
considered to have a lower environmental impact than harvesting more wildlife biomass, 




sustainable resource use and conservation. We should keep in mind though that this study 
was not designed to determine causality; it only demonstrated an association between 
certain cosmological beliefs and wildlife harvests. Aside from the point that correlation 
does not equal causation, much of the behavioral data were collected prior to the survey 
questions about beliefs (perhaps a stronger case for beliefs causing behavior could be 
made if beliefs were measured before behaviors). Also, since wildlife harvests per trip 
were lower for men with more INP cosmological beliefs, it is possible that these men 
were not as skilled at hunting and fishing as other men (why this would be so is itself an 
interesting question). Ultimately, it may turn out that the causal relationship between 
cosmology and ecological behavior is bidirectional.  
There were other study limitations as well. First, the behavioral data used for 
these analyses come from the beginning of May through most of December, which 
corresponds to the wet season. Because fish (but not hunting) harvests peak during the 
dry season from January to May (Koster, 2007), fishing harvest data in this study do not 
reflect fishing harvests for the peak season. Second, some wildlife caught by participants 
during the study period was not weighed. Villagers would travel away from their villages, 
and it is certain that they engaged in some hunting and fishing. Controlling for 
absenteeism helps address this, but does not fully eliminate the issue. Furthermore, 
sometimes people simply did not want to be bothered about having their catches weighed. 
One young man who was a very prolific fisher participated in interviews with field 
assistants inconsistently. Yet, despite the missing data, he nonetheless emerged from the 
behavioral data set as one of the most productive fishers. Third, relying on Spanish and 




Miskitu expressions, opinions, and worldviews. However, the extensive care taken in the 
translation of interview questions, the use of written interview questions (read in 
Miskitu), and the construction of questions that required only simple responses (e.g., 
yes/no) from participants all helped to ensure mutual understanding with respect to the 
specific questions being asked and answers given. Moreover, the commentary many 
participants provided following their yes/no responses to the cosmological questions 
validated the measures by demonstrating not only participants’ comprehension of the 
questions but also their serious contemplation of them. Certainly a richer understanding 
awaits future research.   
 In conclusion, this study showed that Miskitu hunters and fishers whose 
cosmology included beliefs in interconnectedness and nonhuman personhood harvested 
less wildlife. Replication of these results for the Miskitu – as well as extension to other 
cultures – is facilitated by this study’s use of scientific methods. To be sure, however, the 
interpretation of the quantitative data benefitted from the commentaries and thoughtful 
reflections of participants, and I recommend a mixed methods approach – perhaps even 








 The overarching aim of this dissertation was to understand why some people 
behave in ways that are more conducive to sustainable resource use than other people. As 
discussed in the Introduction, sustainability problems can often be characterized as social 
dilemmas because the “rational” strategy for an individual’s short-term self-interest is 
suboptimal if everyone follows the same strategy. Such dilemmas can be overcome 
through social institutions – such as common property regimes – that alter the costs and 
benefits, or at least the perception of costs and benefits, for certain behaviors. However, 
although social institutions are generally analyzed as human institutions, they involve 
nonhuman others – and in some cultures nonhuman others may be thought of as having 
agency and being part of the social community (Descola, 2005; Schmidt & Dowsley, 
2010). These nonhuman others may therefore be more aptly described as nonhuman 
persons, and they may affect how people perceive the costs and benefits of certain 
sustainability-related behaviors. Thus, this dissertation examined how costs and benefits 
were perceived in terms of both common property institutions and cosmological beliefs 
about nonhuman persons, and how these cognitions related to sustainability-related 





Summary of major findings 
 Since this dissertation is organized around three stand-alone papers, I will begin 
by summarizing the major findings of each chapter before drawing some general 
conclusions.  
 
Barriers to institutional efficacy 
 The common property regime in Kipla Sait Tasbaika did not appear to be a high 
functioning one. In interviews many people noted its poor functionality and criticized the 
leaders and forest guards for not fulfilling their enforcement duties. As I argued in 
Chapter 2, there were few incentives for these individuals to incur the costs of monitoring 
and sanctioning their fellow villagers. Additionally, some people perceived the natural 
resource management rules and/or their enforcement as unjust and illegitimate. These 
sentiments may have reduced people’s willingness to comply voluntarily with the 
management rules, thus compounding the problem of weak enforcement. However, there 
were rays of hope for better management in the future: most people recognized that 
human activities were the cause of increasing resource scarcity, and many people thought 
that the natural resource management system should be better enforced in order to ensure 
the well-being of future generations. In other words, people were aware of the problem as 
well as its potential solution. Unfortunately, these beliefs in and of themselves do not 
alter the costs and benefits of prosustainability behavior. I argue that a participatory 
revision of the rules and enforcement system – perhaps with the support of relevant 
external actors – could reduce the costs of monitoring and sanctioning, thereby leading to 




Cognition of compliance 
Chapter 3, which tested hypotheses about the role of four cognitive variables in 
compliance with natural resource management rules, further developed the point that 
awareness of sustainability problems, while perhaps a necessary condition, is insufficient 
for behavioral change. Results showed that people’s beliefs in increasing natural resource 
scarcity and their knowledge of natural resource management rules did not relate to their 
observed compliance with the rules. Looking explicitly at perceptions of costs for 
violating the rules, I found that people’s expectations (in terms of both severity and 
certainty) of civic punishment also did not relate to compliance. Altogether these results 
do not support the notion that these cognitive variables play important roles in 
compliance with common property institutions in Kipla Sait Tasbaika. However, these 
results should be interpreted with caution, bearing in mind the study’s limitations. For 
example, the study only included a few types of violations, and the methods used to 
assess expectations of punishment may have solicited responses about what people 
thought should happen more so than what they thought would happen. 
 
Cosmology and wildlife harvests 
 To test for a relationship between cosmological beliefs about nonhuman others 
and human ecological behavior, in Chapter 4 I analyzed the relationship between 
individuals’ harvests of wildlife and their beliefs in nonhuman personhood, 
interconnectedness between humans and nature, and supernatural punishment by spirit 
guardians for overharvesting. Results for both the full sample and the subsample 




with more of these beliefs (i.e., the combined measure) harvested significantly less 
wildlife biomass than people with fewer such beliefs. Looking at each component of the 
combined measure, people with greater expectations of supernatural punishment 
harvested less wildlife biomass in the full sample, and people with more beliefs in 
interconnectedness and nonhuman personhood harvested less wildlife biomass in the 
subsample. Although the relationship between the cosmological variables and harvest 
size in the full sample was sensitive to outliers, the relationship was robust to outlier 
exclusion for the subsample. Finally, looking at men and women separately, INP 
cosmology was associated with lower harvest size for men only; neither expectations of 
supernatural punishment nor the combined measure had a significant association with 
harvest size for either sex. Taken together, the results of this study suggest that 
cosmologies of interconnectedness and nonhuman personhood may play a role in limiting 
environmental impact, at least when assessed in terms of wildlife biomass harvested.   
 
General conclusions 
 Snodgrass et al. (2013) argued that individuals often do not act according to their 
mental models of nature: “Rather, they decide whether or not to act on a rule or sanction 
associated with a social institution set up to regulate a resource that is collectively 
deemed to be important and worth protecting” (p. 347). However, the results of this 
dissertation suggest that cosmological beliefs regulate resource use more so than common 
property institutions in Kipla Sait Tasbaika. Moreover, the cosmological beliefs that were 
most consistently found to be associated with lower harvests were beliefs about 




together, these results suggest that expectations of sanctions (civic or supernatural) may 
not be as important as INP beliefs for determining how people weigh costs and benefits 
of hunting and fishing activities.  
The relative contribution of cosmologies and institutions to sustainable resource 
use probably varies across cultures and political-economic contexts, and it is likely to 
change if institutional efficacy improves over time. Therefore, instead of emphasizing 
one over the other as the best route to promoting sustainable behavior, researchers and 
policymakers should be alert to situations in which belief systems and institutions 
contradict rather than reinforce each other, as is likely to be the case in communities with 
externally imposed institutions for resource management. In the case of Kipla Sait 
Tasbaika, the natural resource management system was established through participatory 
processes, but its legitimacy and justice were nonetheless questioned by some residents. 
Moreover, de facto enforcement was weak; under conditions of stronger enforcement, 
individual belief systems may have a negligible relationship to resource use. Future 
research could explore this.  
  
Future research 
There are several additional directions for future research. Given the time that has 
elapsed since the research was conducted, there may have been changes to the natural 
resource management rules and enforcement system in Kipla Sait Tasbaika. Revisiting 
the site to determine what, if any, changes have occurred, why they occurred, and how 
well the institutions are now functioning could provide valuable insight into the process 




institutions” (Brooks, 2010, p. 782). For example, now that baseline data have been 
collected on the proportion of people who cooperated and defected from the common 
property institutions, a follow-up study could evaluate whether changes to the institutions 
reduced the proportion of defectors in the population. Also, there is a need for 
interdisciplinary collaboration to develop better methods for analyzing (1) how cognition 
mediates the relationship between social institutions and compliance in common property 
contexts, and (2) how (and why, in an ultimate sense) cosmologies relate to ecological 
behavior and environmental impact. In the interest of brevity, I will focus on three 
specific directions I am especially interested in pursuing. 
 
Cognition and behavior: what is the causal direction? 
The research in this dissertation was motivated by my interest in the relationship 
between cognition and behavior. As implied by the decision to use cognitive variables as 
predictor variables and behavioral variables as outcome variables, I have tended to think 
that beliefs, values, attitudes, and worldviews cause behaviors rather than the other way 
around. However, causality could flow from behaviors to beliefs. This has been argued 
for expectations of punishment and illicit behavior because individuals who violate the 
law and are not punished are less likely to believe in punishment (Paternoster, 1987). 
Likewise, if hunting and fishing failures are more likely than successes to be attributed to 
the agency of the animals or their spirit guardians, then people who are less successful at 
harvesting wildlife may be more likely to hold beliefs in nonhuman persons. In the 
present study, some individuals explained that they did not believe in lasa because they 




hand, individuals with stronger beliefs in lasa might be more likely to attribute 
supernatural causes to unfortunate events and, consequently, perceive supernatural 
punishment where and when others would not. In this way, people’s cosmologies affect 
how they interpret and experience reality, and it may be that no simple relationship 
between beliefs and behavior exists. Future researchers would be wise to entertain the 
possibility that causality is bidirectional.  
 
Measuring INP cosmology cross-culturally 
Although the details of cosmological beliefs vary across cultures, there are certain 
recurring elements of nondualist, animistic thinking across the Americas, Asia, Oceania, 
and, to a lesser degree, Africa (Descola, 2005, 2013). Future research could explore these 
commonalities in a systematic way through the use of a scale like that used in Chapter 4 
to measure INP cosmology. The items included in the final 5-item INP measure were not 
very specific to the Miskitu (in fact, the two items that were the most specific were 
ultimately not included), suggesting that it may be possible to develop a scale, or set of 
related scales, for use in cross-cultural research. Certainly most scales designed for 
measuring pro-environmental values, attitudes, and worldviews have been developed for 
use in “Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies” 
(Henrich et al., 2010, p. 61). Although some items from these scales may be appropriate 
for use in non-WEIRD societies (see Chapter 4), many items are worded in ways that 
betray a worldview in which humans are separate from nature, and nonhuman 
personhood is rarely recognized.21 Therefore, an expanded scale focused on ontologies of 
                                                 
21 For example, the New Ecological Paradigm measures a person’s ecological worldview with 15 items 




animism rather than naturalism (sensu Descola, 2013) could be used to collect systematic 
evidence to inform our understanding of the role of such beliefs in regulating human 
resource use. 
 
Costs, benefits, and moral communities 
 As suggested in Chapter 4, it might be fruitful to think of INP cosmology as 
tapping into a more general construct of self-transcendence. There is convergent thinking 
across several disciplines about the importance of self-transcendence for pro-
environmental behavior. Specifically, anthropologists and others have argued for the 
importance of cosmologies and ontologies that do not draw sharp distinctions between 
humans and the rest of nature (Berkes, 2008; Chernela, 1987; Salmón, 2000; Sponsel, 
2012); psychologists have argued for the importance of empathy, connectedness to 
nature, universalism, and altruistic and ecocentric values and attitudes (Dietz et al., 2005; 
Schultz, 2000; Tam et al., 2013); and even biologists have argued for the importance of 
biophilia (“the innately emotional affiliation of human beings to other living organisms” 
[Wilson, 1993, p. 31]; Kellert & Wilson, 1993; Wilson, 1984). In a sense, they are all 
arguing, as philosophers have done, for the importance of moral inclusiveness (or ethical 
extensionism) for sustainability, i.e., the extension of our moral circle to be more 
                                                                                                                                                 
humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences” (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 434). 
Agreement with this item “indicates a proecological view” because it reflects a belief in “the fragility of 
nature’s balance” (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 433). This is a characteristically Western way of thinking: people 
are not a part of nature; they interfere with it – and in disastrous ways. The view that humans are part of the 
society of nature (Descola 1996, 2005) is not reflected here, nor is the view that humans can contribute 
positively to biodiversity or ecosystem health through their use of traditional ecological knowledge for 
resource management (Berkes, 2008; Gadgil et al., 1993). Moreover, these Western-based scales rarely 
recognize that respondents may think of natural entities as persons. Like Chapter 4, Snodgrass et al. (2013) 
took a step in the right direction with their use of eight items about “nature as a ‘sacred person’” for use in 
Rajasthan, India (e.g., “Mining and the cutting of trees cause the mountain to feel pain” and “The jungle is 





inclusive of others beyond ourselves, our family, our tribe, humans, sentient beings, 
living things, and all existing things (Gorke, 2003; Singer, 2011; see also Schwartz, 
2007).  
Since people’s perceptions of costs and benefits of particular actions are 
presumably affected by considerations of collateral effects, individuals who extend moral 
consideration more widely should be expected to choose different courses of action than 
those with more narrow moral circles (Schwartz, 2007; Stern, 2000). Although it may be 
collectively rational to prioritize the greatest good for the greatest number, individual 
humans tend to prioritize the well-being of those with whom they share biological, 
cultural, and emotional closeness. As products of natural selection, humans may not have 
been selected to have broadly inclusive moral circles (Singer, 2011) – and yet, there is 
variation among people and societies (Schwartz, 2007). What causes this variation and 
what it means for creating a more just and sustainable world are questions worthy of 
























Multiple regression results showing relationship between cosmology measures and log-
transformed kg of wildlife biomass harvested (dependent variable) for the full sample 
excluding cases with standardized residuals greater than 2.5 
 




(n = 108) 
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Outliers 
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(H1) INP cosmology -0.12 
(0.09) 
 ___  ___ 
(H2) Expectations of 
supernatural punishment 
 ___ -0.11 
(0.08) 
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(H3) Combined measure of 
“pro-conservation” cosmology 




































Table 12 continued 
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Adjusted R2 0.25 0.25 0.26 
F 5.45 5.42 5.71 
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